Quantifying institutional impacts and development synergies in water resource programs : a methodology with application to the Kala Oya basin, Sri Lanka by Saleth, R. Maria & Dinar, Ariel
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4498
Quantifying Institutional Impacts and 
Development Synergies in Water 
Resource Programs:
A Methodology with Application to the Kala Oya Basin, 
Sri Lanka






















































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4498
The success of development programs, including water 
resource projects, depends on two key factors: the role 
of underlying institutions and the impact synergies from 
other closely related programs. Existing methodologies 
have limitations in accounting for these critical factors. 
This paper fills this gap by developing a methodology, 
which quantifies both the roles that institutions play in 
impact generation and the extent of impact synergies 
that flows from closely related programs within a 
unified framework. The methodology is applied to the 
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Kala Oya Basin in Sri Lanka in order to evaluate the 
impacts of three water-related programs and the roles 
of 11 institutions in the context of food security. The 
results provide considerable insights on the relative role 
of institutions and the flow of development synergies 
both within and across different impact pathways. The 
methodology can also be used to locate slack in impact 
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With increasing investments in development programs in general and water-related 
programs in particular, there are obvious concerns regarding their actual impacts on 
development objectives.  Two persistent aspects hamper their proper evaluation both in 
economic literature and in development policy: (a) the specific roles that institutions play in 
the process of impact generation and transmission, and (b) the impact synergies that a 
development program derives from past, ongoing, and planned programs.  Exclusion of 
these aspects is very important, particularly in the evaluation of meta development goals 
such as food security, where the realization of the final objective is linked with the progress 
of several intermediate but related targets of a hierarchy of programs spanning across 
sectors and time. 
 
This paper develops and applies a methodology that explicitly captures the effects of both 
institutional roles and development synergies within a unified framework and quantitative 
context.  The development of the framework is illustrated by (a) referring to a set water and 
agriculture-related development programs (system rehabilitation, bulk water delivery, and 
crop diversification), (b) tracing their impact pathways and interaction points, (c) locating 
relevant institutions in these points and pathways, and (d) linking them all with the final 
goal of food security—one of the key targets of the Millennium Development Goals.  This 
framework is, then, translated into a system model with 21 sequentially linked equations, 
comprised of a set of development, institutional, and impact variables.  For the practical 
application of the framework, the Kala Oya Basin in Sri Lanka is taken as the empirical 
context and the perception-based information collected from a sample of 67 experts is used 
as the data source. 
 
The estimation of the model coefficients provides considerable insights on the nature of both 
the roles that different institutions play at various points of the impact pathways as well as 
the synergies that development programs derive from each other.  The sensitivity analysis 
performed with the reduced form equation suggests that, in terms of the marginal effects 
on food security, market institution has the highest effect, followed by others such as price 
regulation and trade policy. Unlike these institutions with a positive effect, there are others 
with a negative contribution such as land tenure and rural development policy.   
 
From the perspective of practical policy, this paper has two main contributions. First, it 
demonstrates the importance of accounting for the institutional impacts and development 
synergies when planning and implementing any new development program in a given region.  
Second, it provides a diagnostic tool both for locating the weak spots and slack links in 
various impact pathways of a development program by identifying the institutions and 
impact chains that are to be strengthened to improve the impact flows of development 
programs. 
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1. MOTIVATION AND CONTEXT 
The motivation for this paper comes from two major gaps persisting in the theory 
and practice related to the critical subjects of development impact and institutional 
analysis.  First, there is a lack of proper treatment of the synergies inherent among 
development programs, projects or policies with common or closely related goals.
1  
These synergies occur not just among ongoing programs but even flow from those 
completed in the past and planned for the future.  The evaluation of the impacts of 
development programs cannot be complete without accounting for these synergies. 
These synergies are particularly important for composite or meta development 
goals (e.g., Millennium Development Goals,
2 combating climatic change, and 
governance reforms). This is because the realization of these goals is critically 
linked with the realization of several intermediate but related goals of a hierarchy of 
development programs.  Second, institutions, defined as a system of legal, policy, 
and organizational components (Bromley, 1989; Ostrom, 1990), play a central role 
both in the facilitation and transmission of development impact. Although the 
general roles of individual institutions are being evaluated in various contexts and 
details (Saleth and Dinar, 2004 and 2008), there is an insufficient attention on the 
individual and joint roles several institutions in the specific context of impact 
generation and transmission. These two gaps are obviously serious in view of the 
bias and gaps they could cause in the planning, implementation, and assessment of 
development programs. 
  Ironically, the issue of the lack of or insufficient treatment of impact 
synergies and the institutional roles in development impact is not entirely new as 
are its consequences to impact assessment, institutional analysis, and development 
planning.  But, the problem persist essentially due to the absence of an empirically 
applicable methodological framework that can bring together the multiple impact 
pathways of two or more development programs within a common analytical 
framework and single evaluation context.  These pathways are very important as 
they capture the various routes through which the impacts of a program are 
transmitted on to the final goal and these routes can be characterized by a chain of 
sequentially and functionally related development, institutional, and impact 
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variables.
3  Existing impact assessment approaches are of no or little help in this 
context due to their inherent analytical limitations.
4  Since they do not elaborate 
the impact process to capture the entire set of impact pathways, they miss the 
opportunity to locate and evaluate the impact role of institutions in the specific 
contexts of different pathways.  With their ex-post orientation and reliance on 
objective data, the existing approaches also become unsuitable particularly in the 
context of multiple and time-lagged projects with continuing, lagged, and uncertain 
flow of impacts.  Here, ex-ante approach and subjective information are 
unavoidable.   
  This paper aims to develop and empirically illustrate a methodology that can 
directly capture both the development synergies and the institutional roles within a 
unified framework and quantitative context.  The methodology is based on an 
analytical framework that traces the major impact pathways between the 
development programs and the development goal and characterizes these 
pathways in terms of the sequential and functional linkages among the 
development, institutional, and impact variables involved.  Since these linkages can 
be translated into a system of structurally linked equations, each capturing different 
impact pathways, the framework can be mathematically translated for empirical 
application and quantitative evaluation.  This paper demonstrates the application of 
this methodology in the empirical context of the Kala Oya Basin in Sri Lanka by 
taking (a) the food security related to the first MDG as the development goal, (b) a 
set of three water-related programs—namely, system rehabilitation, bulk water 
delivery, and crop diversification—as the candidate development programs,
5 and (c) 
the ex-ante information from a sample of 67 stakeholders—consisting largely of 
government officials and national experts—as the data source. 
  From here, the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides a graphical 
illustration of the welfare implications of both the development synergies and 
institutional role and indicates the policy value of their ex-ante evaluation.  Section 
3 sets the analytical framework with the conceptual foundation and building blocks 
of the proposed methodology.  It also presents an institution-impact matrix 
developed in a generic context that can serve as a platform to operationalize the 
conceptual model into an empirically applicable form.  Section 4 describes the study 
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area and highlights its major development challenges.  Section 5 applies the 
institution-impact matrix to the development and institutional context of the study 
region.  It provides both a graphical presentation of the impact pathways in terms 
of a flow diagram and a mathematical representation of these pathways as a set of 
functional relationships evident among development, institutional, and impact 
variables.  Section 6 describes the data source and also provides empirical 
precedence and theoretical justification for using stakeholder-based ex-ante 
information.  Section 7 presents and analyzes the results of the econometric models 
of institution-impact interaction.  It provides statistical evidence for the relative role 
and significance of the development, institutional, and impact variables in difference 
equations representing various impact layers and also demonstrates the structural 
linkages among these equations or layers of impact pathways.  Section 8 provides 
numerical evidence for the size and flow of development synergies and institutional 
impacts based on a sensitivity analysis of the reduced form equation in terms of the 
local and system-wide impacts of a marginal change in different variables.  The 
final section concludes with the analytical and empirical insights of the paper, its 
limitations, and the scope for its future extension and refinement. 
2. IMPACT SYNERGIES AND INSTITUTIONAL ROLES: AN ILLUSTRATION 
When selecting development programs, policy makers usually make an ex-ante 
assessment of their effects both on overall welfare and on its distribution across 
groups in the society.  But, such assessments often ignore the issue of how this 
welfare and its distribution would change when the roles of institutional impacts and 
synergies from related programs are taken into account. The practical importance 
and policy value of considering these changes in such an ex-ante assessment is 
graphically demonstrated using Figure 1, which is an adaptation of a framework 
suggested by Just et al. (2004). 
  Figure 1 depicts a simple economy with two individuals (or groups), i.e., I 
(rich) and J (poor), who, with a given bundle of resources, can produce/consume 
two goods, i.e., food (F) and recreation (R).  Given current technologies and 
institutions, the production possibility frontier for the economy is OP.  Assume that 
the economy is in a status quo at  with a corresponding welfare levels for the 
0 ) , ( j i
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two-person society. Based on the Edgeworth Box analysis, J’s welfare is: 
JF(0)+JR(0) and I’s welfare is [P-JF(0)]+[O-JR(0)].  Now, suppose the government 
wants to take the economy towards the frontier OP and improve, thereby, both the 
total welfare and its distribution. For this, it considers two programs, which are 
expected, a priori, to achieve such economic and social objectives, i.e., a ‘dashed’ 
(dashed line) program (D) and a ‘solid’ (solid line) program (S).  As can be seen 
from Figure 1, the ‘dashed’ program moves the economy from   to   and 
the ‘solid’ program moves the economy to  .  Both policies are Pareto optimal 
in the sense that they satisfy the condition of utility maximization for both 
individuals/groups.  But, the ‘dashed’ program is less efficient as it falls short of the 
production possibilities frontier (OP) and ends with an inner frontier, O’P’<OP.   
However, from a political economy perspective, the ‘dashed’ program can be the 
second best option and it may very well be the final choice of the policy maker. This 
is because I (rich) is less likely to oppose this program with a lower loss in 
allocation as compared to the ‘solid’ program.  
0 ) , ( j i
D j i ) , (
S j i ) , (
  In the discussion so far, the focus is only on the welfare and distribution 
implications of two alternative programs.  In this case, an ex-ante assessment of 
the development path and its economic implications is usually conducted with 
actual and expected information before the policy choice is made.  But, such 
assessments do not account for the economic externalities from institutional 
facilitations and impact synergies from related programs.  Using Figure 1, we can 
demonstrate how the additional welfare gains are missed when impact synergies 
and institutional roles are ignored.  Let us assume that the economy is, again, in 
status quo at  .  Suppose that a development program, say, an irrigation 
project, is implemented, leading to a development path represented by the dashed 
line. Now, the economy attains a new equilibrium at   on  the  production 
frontier O’P’.  Clearly, the new equilibrium, though increasing the welfare with more 
food and recreation, falls short of the optimum.  Suppose, there is another 
development program, say, crop intensification that is also implemented either 
along with or subsequent to the irrigation project.  Since crop intensification 
enhances the welfare impacts of the irrigation-based program, the latter can get 
0 ) , ( j i
D j i ) , (
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considerable development synergies from the former program.  When these impact 
synergies are taken into account, the economy will reach a different production 
frontier and development path with a new equilibrium, say, at  .  This new 
equilibrium, which accounts for the impact synergies, generates higher and still 
equitable allocation of food and recreation.  
S j i ) , (
In a similar vein, we can also demonstrate the welfare gains from 
incorporating the role of institutions.  Suppose that the irrigation-based 
development program is implemented in conjunction with the introduction of a 
water allocation institution (e.g., rotational water supply or volumetric water 
allocation).  In this case, the production possibility frontier will shift outward and 
the development path will also change from the dashed line.  To minimize notations 
and complications, let us consider that the new production frontier is OP and the 
development path is the solid line.  With this, the equilibrium will move from   
to  .  The difference between the two equilibriums shows the welfare gain of 
considering the role of institutions in development process.  We can note here that 
in the context of impact synergies between development programs, although the 
economy is actually at a higher welfare level, project-based impact assessments 
are not able to fully account for them.  But, the problem is still more serious in the 
context of institutional effects because the roles of institutions are not incorporated 
with proper detail in development planning itself, let alone the actual assessment of 
their impact.  
D j i ) , (
S j i ) , (
3. THE METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
The reality of impact synergies associated with multiple programs and the intricate 
roles that institutions play in enhancing and channeling these synergies obviously 
requires a major change in the way development impacts are assessed.  In 
particular, what is needed is an analytical framework that is capable of capturing 
both the individual and collective impacts of development programs as well as the 
intrinsic roles of institutions within the impact generation and transmission process.  
We also need an evaluation methodology that can bring together the impacts of 
multiple programs and the roles of institutions within a common analytical 
framework.  Clearly, this is a major challenge because the required methodology 
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has to be generic enough to transcend disciplinary boundaries and empirical 
limitations.  But, as we will argue below, it is possible to construct such a generic 
methodology by selectively combining useful elements from the methodologies, 
which are used both in the impact assessment and institutional analysis literatures.  
3.1. Conceptual Setting 
The conceptual setting for the generic methodology is presented in Figure 2. This 
setting suggests indeed the basic conception of a model of institution-impact 
interactions in the context of a given region.  Specifically, there are three sets of 
interactions, i.e., among development programs (capturing impact synergy), 
among institutions (capturing institutional linkages), and among the programs, 
institutions, and food security (capturing together the development and institutional 
impacts on food security). The required methodology has to be broad enough to 
simultaneously handle all these interactions. As will be argued below, such a 
methodology can be developed by combining suitably adapted analytical and 
methodological elements from the impact assessment and institutional economics 
literatures.  Specifically, some of the existing impact assessment methods can be 
used to handle the impacts of and interactions among development programs 
whereas some of the institutional analysis methods can be used to capture the 
mediating roles and development impacts of institutions. 
3.2. Building Blocks of the Methodology 
Despite their analytical and empirical limitations, some of the impact assessment 
methods do have useful elements for building a generic methodology for evaluating 
multiple and time-lagged programs.  One of them is the Method for Impact 
Assessment of Programmes and Projects (MAPP).
6 Although MAPP allows an 
integrated evaluation of multiple programs with stakeholder-based information, it 
has few major but avoidable analytical and empirical limitations.  First, it is not 
capturing all impact pathways and channels operating between the programs and 
their final goals.  Second, the important roles of institutional factors, especially their 
interactions with other development and impact factors are not incorporated.  In 
fact, this problem emerges directly from the first limitation because the institutional 
roles cannot be evaluated without considering the impact pathways in the first 
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place. Finally but more importantly, the point-based evaluation used in this method 
allows only a qualitative but not a quantitative analysis. This is because the points 
awarded by stakeholders are not on metric scale with an absolute point to serve as 
benchmark.  While the first two problems can be rectified with suitable extensions 
and adjustments of MAPP, the last one can be solved with few intermediate steps 
for making the point system relative and comparable (see Neubert, 2006).  
  Another method that has useful inputs for the present purpose is the Poverty 
and Social Impact Assessment (PSIA) method.
7  Despite its focus on single program, 
PSIA not only focuses on few specific impact pathways but also allows the use of 
perceptional data and ex-ante analysis (see Coudouel, Dani, and Paternostro, 
2006:12).  This method with few adjustments can provide some key elements for 
building a more generic and robust methodology.  First, the number of impact 
pathways has to be increased to consider major, if not all possible, impact 
pathways.  This is essential to enrich the analytical framework so that it can 
capture both the development synergies and institutional impacts, which are 
captured and channeled through various impact pathways.  Second, even though 
the PSIA recognizes the exogenous influence of institutional factors, it is necessary 
to explicitly incorporate them as part of the evaluation framework itself and also 
analytically capture their interactions with other development and impact variables 
characterizing different impact pathways.  Third, the use of ex-ante approach and 
stakeholder information, though important to deal with the impact expectation and 
uncertainty, still may lead to a serious bias as long as the evaluation is performed 
by the direct beneficiaries (Coudouel, Dani, and Paternostro, 2006:11).  This is an 
important empirical point, which strongly suggests the need to select neutral 
stakeholders or a more balanced group of respondents.
8  
  Besides the selective adaptation and use of relevant analytical and empirical 
elements from the impact assessment literature, we also need similar elements 
from the institutional economics literature, mainly for capturing the institutional 
dimension of the required methodology.  In this respect, the theoretical framework 
developed by Saleth and Dinar (2004) is particularly useful for explicitly accounting 
for the specific roles of institutions within the process of impact generation and 
transmission.
9  The central components of this framework are: the institutional 
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ecology principle, the institutional decomposition and analysis (IDA) approach 
[similar to that of E. Ostrom (1990)], the ex-ante approach, and the adaptive 
instrumental evaluation (Tool, 1977; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Bromley, 
1985).  While these concepts are elaborated in detail by Saleth and Dinar (2004) 
and described briefly in Annex A, let us note here how they are used to set the 
analytical framework for evaluating the institution-impact interaction in the present 
context.  The institutional ecology principle enables one to view regional or river 
basin level institutions as a nested and interlinked system embedded within a given 
physical, social, and political economy setting. The IDA framework allows an 
analytical unbundling of both the impact transmission process and the regional or 
basin institutions (i.e., those related to water, land, agriculture and environment).  
The unbundling can identify the key impact pathways and trace the relevant 
institutional configurations operating beneath the pathways associated with 
different development programs. As we will show later, the ‘adaptive instrumental 
evaluation’ is used to provide theoretical support and practical justification for the 
reliance on perception-based ex-ante qualitative information collected from a 
sample of stakeholders.  
  As we adopt the framework of Saleth and Dinar (2004), we also need to 
introduce some important adjustments.  The needed adjustments are:  
First, institutional evaluation is to be specialized within a regional context 
(e.g., river basin or other compact regions), where it is easier to (a) identify 
relevant development programs, which can be completed, ongoing, or planned, (b) 
trace the major and theoretically possible impact pathways of these programs, (c) 
map all the relevant institutions operating at various points of these impact 
pathways, and (d) evaluate the development impacts and institutional roles in 
various paths with contextual information. 
Second, the evaluation is to be extended to cover not just water institutions 
but also the land, agricultural, rural, and economic institutions within an integrated 
framework.  
And, third, the evaluation has also to be performed within the framework of a 
multi-dimensional institution-impact matrix, which captures the major impact 
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pathways of different development programs, the roles of the underlying 
development, institutional, and impact variables, and the ultimate implications for 
the development goals.  The derivation of this institutional-impact matrix, including 
its analytical implications, is illustrated in the following section. 
3.3. Institution-Impact Matrix 
The institution-impact matrix translates the conceptual model shown in Figure 2 
into an operational form.  This matrix captures the functional relationships and 
synergy among the impact pathways of development programs, the underlying 
institutional configurations, and the development goals.  To illustrate how this 
institution-impact matrix can be derived for the context of multiple development 
programs, let us take food security as the development goal and the following three 
as the candidate development programs, i.e., water development project (or dam 
construction), introducing a new crop variety, and watershed development for 
land/soil improvement.  These three programs are related to each other not only in 
terms of their development synergies but also in terms of their direct or indirect 
impacts on the development goal, i.e., food security, and also on its three sub-
components, i.e., income (employment), food prices (output), and sustainability 
(resource use efficiency).  The next step is to identify the major impact pathways of 
these three programs and characterize the possible institutional configurations that 
shape these pathways.  Given these impact pathways and their institutional 
configurations, the next step is to link them with the income, price, and resource 
components (or the intermediary targets) of the food security goal.  As we put 
them together in a matrix form, as shown in Figure 3, we obtain an institution-
impact matrix, which gives a generic operational form for the conceptual model 
depicted in Figure 2. 
  Let us note few points that will enhance our understanding of the institution-
impact matrix.  First, it is only to simplify its exposition that the matrix includes 
only the main impact pathways of the development programs. Since the impacts in 
each of these pathways are transmitted through several routes, there will be more 
rows than five, each with different institutional configurations.
10  Second, although 
each of the impact pathways obviously involve the physical, agronomic, and 
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economic variables, they are not shown in the matrix partly to avoid expositional 
complications and partly to highlight what sort of institutional elements can be 
involved in these impact pathways. Third, the institutional configurations specified 
for different impact pathways are not exhaustive but only illustrative.  It only shows 
how different institutional configurations are involved in the generation and 
transmission of impacts through various pathways.  Fourth, although the rows in 
Figure 3 show only the generic institutional aspects, it is possible to identify one or 
more specific variables to represent these aspects.  With such variables as well as 
the variables underlying various impact pathways, it is also possible to characterize 
the interaction between institutional and impact variables.
11  And, finally, even 
though the institutional configurations are common across impact pathways, the 
relative impacts of individual institutions in these configurations can be different, 
depending not only on the non-institutional variables with which they interact but 
also on the sub-components to which they are related. 
  The points noted above suggest that each row of the matrix implicitly has 
additional rows representing the various possible impact routes underlying different 
impact pathways.  Since we have three intermediary target goals in this example, 
each of these rows also involves three separate but related causal relationships.  
That is, in these relationships, the impact and institutional variables will form the 
independent variables and the variable(s) representing the three goals will be the 
dependent variable.  In this sense, all the rows corresponding to each of the three 
development programs can, in principle, be translated into an empirically testable 
set of relationships.  These relationships or equations capture the interactions 
among the development programs, existing institutions, the interim impacts, and 
the ultimate impacts on the final development goal.  Obviously, the dimension of 
the matrix or the number of these equations depends on the number of 
development programs, the impact pathways and their underlying impact routes, 
and the sub-goals being considered.  But, the key point to note here is that in view 
of the intrinsic relationships among the development, institutional, and impact 
variables both within and across equations, there is a structurally linkage among 
equations.  This fact allows us to embed all the equations into a single but long 
chain equation.   
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  To demonstrate how the set of implicit equations within the institution-impact 
matrix is transformed into a single equation, let us define the following sets of four 
equations: 
) , ( d
p
d d N D d D
− = ........................................................................................... [A] 
) , ( n
p
n n D N n N
− = ........................................................................................... [B] 
) , , (
p
m m m m M D N m M
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) ( g M g G = .................................................................................................. [D] 
[A] represents a set of equations capturing the effects of the vectors of 
independent development variables (
p
d D
− ) and institutional variables ( d N ) on the 
vector of dependent development variables ( d D ).  Similarly, [B] represents a set of 




− ) on the vector of dependent institutional variables ( n N ). 
[C] represents a set of equations capturing the effects of the vectors development 




− ) on the vector of dependent impact variables ( m M ).  But, [D] is a single 
equation capturing the effects of the vector of impact variables ( g M ) on the final 
Goal ( ). Having specified the system, let us note four points. First, the vector  G
n m d x N M D X = X
p
x , , ; , , = ∀
−  is actually a subset of the vector  x X , which covers only 
the independent variables within the larger set.  Second, the development 
programs, institutional variables, and their multifarious impacts on development 
goals are all represented by suitably defined variables appearing on both side of the 
equations.  Third, the total number of equations underlying the system defined by 
[A]-[D] will be:  .  Finally, but more importantly, the equations within the 
system have a clear sequential linkage among them.  Given these points, it is easy 
to show the system defined by [A]-[D] can be reduced into a single equation: 
n m d + + + 1








n M D N n D d D N n m g G
− − − − =  ..........................................................[E] 
This equation, a mathematical replica of the institution-impact matrix, is an 
important analytical and empirical tool.  When an equation of this form is 
empirically specified and statistically estimated, it can provide very valuable 
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theoretical and policy insights both on the internal dynamics of institution-impact 
interaction and on the extent and flow of development synergies and institutional 
impacts. The empirical derivation and application of the framework set by [A] to [E] 
will be illustrated in the case of the Kala Oya Basin in Sri Lanka.  
4. THE EMPIRICAL CONTEXT: THE KALA OYA BASIN, SRI LANKA 
The development and application of the institution-impact assessment methodology 
is demonstrated here by considering the institutional and development setting of 
the Kala Oya Basin in Sri Lanka (Figure 4).  The Kala Oya Basin, which is one of the 
108 basins in Sri Lanka, covers an area of 2,873 square kilometers and supports a 
population of about 0.41 million.  Of the total land area of 287,303 hectares (ha), 
far less than a third is cultivable due to land slope and quality issues and other soil-
related problems and water-related constraints.  Paddy cultivation and home 
gardens with coconuts and fruit trees account for 40 percent of the cultivated area 
(de Silva et al., 2006).  The average farm size is only about one ha in areas under 
minor irrigation and dryland farming and less than half a ha in areas under major 
irrigation schemes.  In addition, only 27 percent of the population own a homestead 
and 11 percent of the population own neither a homestead nor land (see Bandara, 
undated).  On the demographic side, increasing population density, out-migration, 
and aging are major issues.  
  Water scarcity is a serious problem due to low level and seasonal pattern of 
rainfall as well as groundwater quality problems.  The Basin is generally dry for the 
most of the year with the rainfall ranging from less than 50 mm to about 300 mm.  
While the high rainfall level occurs only during October and November, the low level 
occurs in February, March, June, July, and August.  With an annual local inflow of 
about 343 million cubic meters (mcm), the Basin also receives an annual diversion 
of about 480 mcm from the Mahaweli system.  But, given the total demand of 
1695.28 mcm, there is still a major supply short fall, creating a serious water 
scarcity problem for the basin (see Bandara, undated; de Silva et al, 2006). The 
issue is further complicated by serious groundwater quality problems caused by 
hardness, fluoride content, and iron concentrations.  Of the basin groundwater 
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resources, 74 percent is affected by various forms of fluoride problems and 40 
percent is affected by unsafe iron concentrations (Bandara, undated). 
  The incidence of poverty remains substantial in the basin.  For example, in 
the Anuradhapura district, which accounts for half of the basin area, the percentage 
of people below the official poverty line (Rs. 1423 or US$14/capita/month) was 
estimated to be 20 percent during 2000-01 (de Silva et al., 2006).  In addition, 44 
percent of the families in the basin rely regularly on Samurdhi,  the safety net 
program of the government for the poor.  Closely related to the poverty issue, food 
insecurity is also a serious problem, as many villages in the basin area fall under 
the most vulnerable categories of food insecurity (DCS and WFP, 2005).  A more 
detailed review of the Basin’s poverty level and the strategic reasons for its 
selection for our case study can be found in Saleth et al. (2007).   
5. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL 
For the empirical translation of the institution-impact matrix in Figure 3, we need to 
specify the development goal, select the candidate development programs, and 
identify the relevant set of institutions.  Considering the poverty levels and food 
insecurity conditions in the study area, we obviously selected food security as the 
development goal for analysis. This goal, which is directly related to the hunger 
reduction target of the first MDG, is also one of the priority goals of policy set by 
t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  S r i  L a n k a .  A s  t o  the candidate development programs, we 
selected three water and food-related programs relevant for the study region.  They 
are: system rehabilitation (already completed) and bulk water delivery (being 
piloted), and crop diversification (potentially relevant).
12  This choice allows us to 
evaluate not only the interaction between the water-related programs but also their 
implications for other programs in a related sector such as agriculture. Given the 
choice of the development goal and programs, it is now possible to trace and 
delineate some of the major pathways through which these programs could affect 
food security.  Given these impact pathways, it is also possible to identify the 
relevant set of institutions (i.e., water, land, agriculture, and food-related legal, 
policy, and organizational aspects) that are likely to affect the generation and 
transmission of impacts at different points of the impact transmission process.   
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Figure 5 depicts these impact pathways and their underlying institutional 
configurations.  
  Before interpreting Figure 5, it is important to recognize that it shows only 
one of the many possible ways of conceptualizing the impact pathways of the 
development programs. But, depending on the details required, it can be made 
richer (and also be made more complicated) by adding more development 
programs, impact pathways, and the institutional and impact details.  Even though 
Figure 5 covers only a few of the many possible impact pathways, it is still able to 
capture the most important and also policy-wise more relevant among these 
pathways.  Notably, these pathways will be different depending on the kind of 
development programs, regional contexts, and final development goal being 
considered for evaluation.  More importantly, the flow diagram of impact pathways 
always assumes a particular environment as characterized by the physical, 
economic, and institutional context of the region being evaluated.  Any change in 
this environment is likely to affect the relationship among the variables 
characterizing the impact pathways being considered.  These changes can be 
captured either through observed or ex-ante information.
13  
  With the points noted above, we can see in Figure 5 how the development 
programs interact with each other and with the physical and economic aspects in 
order to generate their development impacts and synergies. In the impact 
transmission process, we can also identify which institutions influence the process 
at what points.  While it is common to read Figure 5 from left to right in line with 
the direction of pathways and impact flows, for analytical convenience, it is useful 
to move recursively, i.e., starting first with the development goal, then, tracing 
back to its immediate and intermediate determinants till we reach finally the 
development program.  In doing so, we can identify all possible impact pathways 
and channels evident in Figure 5.  In view of their functional and sequential 
linkages, these pathways and channels can be characterized as formal relations 
using appropriate chains of development, institutional, and impact variables defined 
in Table 1.
14  That is, using these variables, Figure 5 can be equally represented in 
a mathematical from as a system of linked equations.  But, before attempting this, 
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it is instructive to understand the nature, format, and logic of the variables listed in 
Table 1.  
  As can be seen from Table 1, the model includes one development goal 
variable, three variables for the development programs, 17 impact variables, and 
11 institutional variables.
15  Obviously, the variables differ considerably in terms of 
their unit of measurement, amenability for observation, and availability of data.  To 
avoid the problems due to their diverse features, we conceive all the variables 
essentially in a notional and qualitative sense to be evaluated on an interval of 1-
10, with 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest.
16  In this format, the 
variables capture only the overall perception of the evaluators (i.e., sample 
stakeholders) as to their status, change, effectiveness, or impact.  For example, the 
food security variable represents only an overall perception of its notional status 
considering implicitly, the adequacy and quality of food consumption across 
income/social groups.  It is considered to be affected by three proximate variables, 
i.e., income, food prices, and food availability. Similarly, the variables representing 
the development programs are considered to capture their overall impact potential. 
Since the impact potential is intimately linked program planning and 
implementation, the program-related variables also implicitly capture the 
effectiveness of development administration.  
  Institutional variables capture the status, effectiveness, or impact of 
institutions with respect to different impact pathways.  For example, the variable 
LANTENUR captures the conduciveness of land tenure (farm size and ownership) to 
crop pattern changes, land productivity improvements, etc.  CUSINSTN captures 
the effects of local customs and conventions on economic and social aspects such 
as crop choice, wage fixation, water sharing, and community management.   
Similarly, WATINSTN represents the effectiveness of the organizational aspects 
related to water allocation and distribution within the system level whereas 
WAGELAWS represents the effectiveness of legal provisions related to minimum 
wage and working conditions.  Likewise, the other institutional variables capture the 
effectives of other legal, policy, and organization-related institutional aspects in 
different contexts. The impact variables, which are essentially physical and 
economic in nature, capture the actual or expected changes due to the impacts of 
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programs and institutions in different stages of the impact generation and 
transmission process.  Among the income variables, a distinction is made between 
AGLINCOM and FAMINCOM with the former covering only the income from 
agriculture and the latter covering both agricultural and livestock incomes). But, 
LABINCOM, the income of laborers, covers wage and livestock incomes. These three 
income variables are needed to capture the differential income potentials between 
those with and without land and livestock.  Given the set of variables listed in Table 
1, the institution-impact framework in Figure 5 can be formally represented in a 
mathematical form with a set of following 21 equations that comprise the system 
model of institution-impact interaction. 
BULKWATD  =  f1 (SYSREHAB, LANTENUR)....................................................[1] 
CROPDIVR   =  f2 (BULKWATD, FAMINSTN) ...................................................[2] 
CROPATEN   =  f3 (CROPDIVR, LANTENUR, CUSINSTN) ...................................[3] 
WATINSTN   =  f4 (BULKWATD, LANTENUR, CUSINSTN) ..................................[4] 
WATPRODY  =    f5 (CROPATEN, WATINSTN, FAMINSTN)...................................[5] 
LANHELTH   =  f6 (CROPATEN, WATPRODY, LANTENUR)..................................[6] 
LANPRODY   =  f7 (CROPATEN, LANHELTH, FAMINSTN) ...................................[7] 
FEDSUPLY =  f8 (CROPATEN, CUSINSTN)....................................................[8] 
LIVSTOCK   =  f9 (FEDSUPLY, TRDPOLCY).....................................................[9] 
NFAMENTS   =  f10 (CROPATEN, RDVPOLCY) ................................................[10] 
LABPRODY   =  f11 (LANPRODY, CROPATEN) ................................................[11] 
WAGERATE = f12 (LABPRODY, NFAMENTS, WAGELAWS)..............................[12] 
RURALEMP   =  f13 (LANPRODY, WAGERATE, NFAMENTS, LIVSTOCK)...............[13] 
CULTCOST   =  f14 (CROPATEN, WAGERATE, FAMINSTN, SUBPOLCY) ..............[14] 
AGLINCOM   =  f15 (LANPRODY, CULTCOST, MKTINSTN)................................[15] 
FAMINCOM   =  f16 (AGLINCOM, NFAMENTS, LIVSTOCK)................................[16] 
LABINCOM   =  f17 (RURALEMP, NFAMENTS, LIVSTOCK, SAMPOLCY) ...............[17] 
FOODPROD  =  f18 (CROPATEN, LANPRODY, WATPRODY)...............................[18] 
FOODAVAL =  f19 (FOODPROD, TRDPOLCY, MKTINSTN) ...............................[19] 
FOODPRIC =    f20 (FOODPROD, PRICREGL, MKTINSTN)................................[20] 
FOODSECT = f21 (FOODAVAL, FOODPRIC, FAMINCOM, LABINCOM) ..............[21] 
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  It can be verified that each of these equations correspond to one of the 21 
impact pathways evident in Figure 5.  The configuration of variables chosen for 
each equation is based on two considerations: (a) the functional relationship 
expected between them and the independent variable as per economic reasoning 
and (b) the need for avoiding linkages among independent variables to minimize 
the scope for the econometric problem of multicollinearity.  The equations are 
arranged sequentially, starting with the initiation and implementation of the 
development programs, then, with their impacts in the order of their occurrences, 
and finally, ending with the impact on the ultimate development goal, i.e., food 
security.  Figure 6 depicts the pattern of sequential linkages evident among the 
model equations.  The order in which the equations are sequenced captures the 
relative position of different layers within the upstream-downstream continuum of 
impact transmission.  Given the functional linkages among variables and sequential 
linkages among equations, the impact and institutional variables can be 
hierarchically arranged by tracing their role and positions both within and across 
the impact pathways. As argued in section 3.3 and will be show in section 8, this 
sequential feature is used to derive the single-equation reduced form for system 
model and also to trace size and flow of the system-wide impacts of marginal 
changes in different variables. 
Another important aspect of the system model is that of the 32 variables, the 
11 underlined variables are independent or exogenous, which includes one of the 
development programs (SYSREHAB) and all the institutional variables except water 
institution (WATINSTN).  But, the remaining 21 variables are dependent or 
endogenous covering 17 impact variables, two development variables representing 
respectively the two programs of CROPDIVR and BULKWATD, and one institutional 
variable representing WATINSTN.  From an econometric perspective, let us also 
note that given the way all the 21 equations are specified in terms of the 
configuration of endogenous and exogenous variables, they satisfy both the rank 
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6. DATA SOURCES 
The system model is econometrically consistent and intuitively appealing, but it has 
a major empirical challenge. This is because consistent and comparable data on 
both the development, institutional, and impact variables are very difficult to 
obtain.  It is certainly possible to acquire observed data on some of the impact 
variables (e.g., productivity, employment, income, and wage rates) through, for 
example, published records or primary surveys.  But, such data can represent only 
the past impact of an already implemented development program and can not 
capture the synergy from the expected impacts of ongoing and planned program.  
Still more serious are the difficulties in getting the data on institutional variables, 
especially on their diverse but specific roles in the generation and transmission of 
development impacts.  
  The absence or lack of data on most variables does not, however, mean a 
complete absence of information. Highly relevant information is constantly 
processed, coded, and stored in the minds of people involved in the development 
process either as planners and implementers or as beneficiaries. Such real but 
latent information, embodied in individuals, can be tapped through a carefully 
designed and conducted stakeholder surveys.  This form of survey data, though 
based on stakeholders’ perception, have many desirable properties often missed by 
the so called objective or observed data.  For example, unlike observed data 
characterizing a past and static situation, the perception-based data can capture 
and synthesize objective, subjective, and aspiration-related information.  Similarly, 
they can also capture the ex-ante and dynamic elements. It is also theoretically 
legitimate in view of the subjective nature of institutions (Commons, 1934; V. 
Ostrom, 1980; Douglas, 1986; E. Ostrom, 1990) and the roles that the ‘subjective 
model’ of the ‘agents of institutional change’ play in institutional change and 
performance (North, 1990).  As a result, there is a long tradition of using such data 
for institutional analysis (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1986; Gray and Kaufmann, 1998; 
Barret and Graddy, 2000; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2006).  As noted 
already, qualitative data are also used in the few impact assessment methods 
discussed earlier (Neubert, 2000; Coudouel, Dani, and Paternostro, 2006). 
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  Perceptions can be used as an evaluation mechanism not only to synthesize 
objective, de facto, ex-ante, and subjective information but also to bring variables 
in different domains into a common evaluation context.  In view of these properties, 
perception-based information is similar in format and quality to those derived from 
alternative non-market data generation techniques such as ‘Delphi’, ‘Contingent 
Valuation’, and ‘Stated Preference’ (see Saleth and Dinar, 2004). More importantly, 
perception can also be used to operationalize the ‘adaptive instrumental evaluation’ 
approach, where the outcomes are evaluated in positive and relative terms with 
respect to reference points that are not static but change with learning and 
expectations (Tool, 1977; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Bromley, 1985)  Thus, 
the comparability of perception-based information from different stakeholders can 
be ensured when their reference points are, more or less, similar, if not common.  
This reference point can be related to the minimum and maximum values or the 
best and worst performance, which are either expected or observed in practice. 
Given this fact and the possibility for convergence in understanding and evaluation 
standards through interaction and learning, it is reasonable to use stakeholder-
based information for empirical evaluation of the model of institution-impact 
interactions. 
While the rationale and justification for the use of perception-based data are 
clear, to collect such data with good quality and consistency, it is important to 
follow few steps.  First is the clear specification of the spatial context of evaluation.  
Since we consider multiple institutions that transcend sectoral boundaries and vary 
across provinces, it is essential to select the study area to be entirely within a 
single jurisdictional boundary. It is for this reason that our evaluation is confined to 
the North Central Province, which accounts for 80 percent of the Kala Oya Basin.  
Second is the selection of suitable sample. The sample of stakeholders selected has 
to be sufficient enough to capture diversity and balanced enough to minimize bias.  
On this count, the sample selected here covers 67 individuals, who are directly 
involved in, or familiar with, the development planning, implementation, and 
evaluation in the Kala Oya Basin.
18  They include high-ranking officials from 
government departments working at different spatial levels (32), researchers, 
academics, and NGO members (32), and farmers and community leaders (3).
19  
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The final but more important aspect is the design and administration of the survey 
instrument used for eliciting the perception-based information. To collect the 
information on all the 32 variables included in the model, a special survey 
instrument was developed and administered to sample stakeholders in May 2006. 
The survey instrument is included as Annex B.  It shows how different variables are 
defined and how their values were derived from the answers to one or more 
questions.  These questions were presented in such a way as to elicit information 
on a given variable from different angles and perspectives.  In almost all cases, the 
values of the variables were obtained as the average of the values for related 
questions.
20 Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the 32 variables. 
7. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
Before presenting the econometric results, it is instructive to note first the way the 
model and the equations are specified.  In order to select the appropriate functional 
forms for the model equations, the specification test suggested by Hausman (1978) 
was performed.  This test was used to compare two models both with constant 
terms but with different functional forms, i.e., linear and log-linear.  Since this test 
suggested that the linear specification yields a more efficient and consistent 
estimates, we adopted this specification for all the equations in the model.  We also 
performed a test for multicollinearity.
21  Although multicollinearity was not a serious 
problem with the model variables, we also tried to ensure that this is also true at 
the level of individual equations.  The correlation matrix for variables at the 
equation levels suggest that in many equations, a few variables are highly 
correlated mainly with the constant term.  To eliminate this potential for 
multicollinearity, we estimated all equations without the constant term. 
  With the same specification, i.e., the linear form with no constant term, we 
have also estimated two versions of the model of institution-impact interaction. The 
first is a single equation model, where food security is postulated as a simple linear 
function of all the remaining 31 development, institutional, and impact variables.  
This simple model, in fact, captures the conventional approach, which assumes 
away the specifics and dynamics of institution-impact interactions. The second 
version is the system model, which specifically captures the mechanics of impact 
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generation and transmission in terms of 21 sequentially linked equations. By 
comparing the two models and their results, we can show the additional insights 
from a more realistic modeling and evaluation of the process of institution-impact 
interaction and also the specific points where different institutions have their 
influence on and interaction with other impact variables.  As to the estimation 
procedure, the single equation model was estimated using the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) method while the system model was estimated using the Three-Stage 
Least Squares (3-SLS) approach. 
  The OLS results of the single equation model, which captures the 
conventional approach to institution-impact interaction, are presented in Table 3.  
Since the single equation model postulates the development, institutional, and 
impact variables to directly influence food security, it is not able to characterize the 
actual paths and mechanics of the interactions and impacts.   Consequently, as can 
be seen from Table 3, the OLS results show that none of the institutional variables 
is statistically significant. This is also true with the variables representing the three 
development programs.  Even among the 17 impact variables, only five are 
significant at 10 percent or better.  These significant impact variables are: 
LABPRODY, WAGERATE, AGLINCOM, FAMINCOM, and LABINCOM.  Notably, all of 
them, except AGLINCOM, have the expected positive effect.  The negative effect of 
AGLINCOM, especially given the positive effect of FAMINCOM, is clearly inconsistent 
with expectation, as it suggests a negative association between agricultural income 
and food security. This inconsistency taken with the insignificance of institutional 
and development variables clearly suggests the potential for serious anomalies 
when a single equation model is used to describe the reality of a complex set of 
sequential and simultaneous interactions among the model variables.  This problem 
gets still more serious because institutional roles are treated superficially or 
exogenously, missing the reality of their intricate and endogenous roles within 
development process. 
  In contrast, the system model results presented in Table 4 demonstrate the 
additional policy insights that can be derived with a more realistic treatment of 
institutions, especially considering their mediating roles both in the generation and 
transmission of development impacts.  Since development impacts and institutions 
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influence each other, the mediating roles can be seen better when the specific 
points at which these influences are fed into the process of impact transmission.  
From this perspective, the key aspect to note from Table 4 is the way both the 
institutional influences and the development impacts are transmitted across the 
equations.  The operational mechanisms for such transmissions are the sequential 
linkages among the equations (see Figure 6).  Given this fact, our interpretation of 
the results will proceed along the equations to show how the dependent variables in 
the initial and intermediate equations capture and transmit development synergies 
and institutional impacts onto the ultimate goal of food security.  In the 
interpretation, we also show how the relative size and statistical significance of the 
coefficients of different institutional and impact variables can be used to indicate 
the possible weak spots and missing links both within and across the impact 
transmission pathways. 
  Before proceeding, we can note that the results in Table 4 have the 
necessary econometric credentials, particularly in terms of their efficiency, 
consistency, and stability properties as ensured both by the specification test and 
multicollinearity correction.  Despite a low R
2 for individual equations, the System 
R
2 is relatively high and the Chi-Square statistic is statistically significant, 
suggesting a strong overall explanatory power of the model as a whole.  These 
econometric properties only suggest that the model has fitted well the data, but 
what is more important for the interpretation of the results are the econometric 
implications of the nature of the data source being used.  Since the data is based 
on stakeholders’ perception, the estimated coefficients of the model provide a 
statistical representation of the prevailing consensus on the nature and direction of 
the effects of different variables.  For that same reason, the coefficients also 
summarize the effects of both the perceived objective reality and the revealed 
subjective expectation of sample stakeholders. It is with these points in mind that 
we interpret the equation-specific results along with their system level implications.  
  Equations [1] and [2] capture the potential impact synergies among the 
three development programs.  These synergies are both positive and statistically 
significant.  In Equation [1], SYSREHAB, the physical intervention that can improve 
the performance of water infrastructure, has a significant positive effect on the 
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BULKWATD, the institutional intervention that can improve water distribution.  As 
can be seen in Equation 2, BULKWATD, in turn, has a significant positive effect on 
the agricultural intervention of CROPDIVR, suggesting that bulk water allocation 
enhances the prospects for crop diversification.
22  The role of institutional variable 
in these equations, unlike the LANTENUR in Equation [1], FAMINSTN in Equation [2] 
is significant and also has a positive effect.  This suggests that land tenure is not at 
all a constraint for bulk water distribution whereas farm institutions related to input 
supply and extension have a facilitative role in crop diversification. 
  The results of equations [1] and [2] suggest that the infrastructural and 
institutional factors are conducive for crop diversification in the region.  But, it is 
important to see whether such a diversification prospect is actually translated in 
terms of changes in existing crop pattern.  Obviously, the extent of crop pattern 
changes depends not only on the effectiveness of the crop diversification program 
but also on the role of institutional factors such as land tenure and customary 
practices in crop choice.  The results for Equation [3] show that all the three 
variables—representing both the CROPDIVR program and the CUSINSTN and 
LANTENUR institutions—have significant positive effects on CROPATEN.  Since 
CROPATEN captures the extent the food crops dominate the existing crop pattern, 
the positive effects of both CUSINSTN and LANTENUR are understandable in view of 
the fact that both customs and farm size favor food crops.  But, the positive effect 
of CROPDIVR means that the diversification program even when it is actually 
implemented in the region will not be able to alter existing food crop dominated 
crop pattern.  In effect, this suggests the powerful role of customs and other 
economic and institutional constraints. 
  Equation [4] captures the effects that bulk water delivery, land tenure, and 
customary institutions have on the overall functioning and performance of water 
institution.  As expected, the program of bulk water delivery has a positive and 
highly significant effect on water institutions, suggesting its potential role in 
strengthening user organizations and promoting orderly water distribution.  But, 
both the customary practices and land tenure system have a negative but non-
significant effect, which means that these two institutions do not pose any problem 
to the functioning of water institutions.  Equation [5] evaluates the relative role of 
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factors affecting water productivity.  The results for this equation shows that of the 
three variables postulated to affect WATPRODY, only CROPATEN is significant with a 
positive effect.  Despite their positive effects, both WATINSTN and FAMINSTN 
remain insignificant. This means that water productivity is perceived to depend not 
on the water and farm-related institutions but only on the food-crop dominated 
crop pattern. This result seems to contradict the expectation that water productivity, 
especially in value terms, will be higher with non-food and commercial crops.  But, 
given the ineffectiveness of crop diversification program, the weakness of water 
and farm institutions, and the low physical productivity and poor market institutions 
for non-food crops, this result need not be surprising. 
  It can be seen in Equation [6] that of the three variables expected to affect 
LANHELTH, both CROPATEN and WATPRODY have significant positive effects 
whereas LANTENUR has a negative but insignificant effect.  This result is 
understandable partly because the biomass of cereals, especially paddy straw, is 
commonly used for mulching and partly because higher water productivity is likely 
to lead to efficient water use favorable for soil conservation.  Equation [7] provides 
statistical evidence for the relative role of physical, agronomic, and institutional 
factors in determining land productivity. The result shows that only the two physical 
and agronomic variables, i.e., land and soil health and crop pattern, are significant 
with the expected positive effect.  Notably, FAMINSTN, the variable capturing the 
overall effectiveness and performance of farm input and extension institutions, has 
a negative but non-significant effect.  This clearly means that these institutions, 
though have the capacity to perform routine roles as well as to support crop 
diversification (see Equation [2]), are not tuned well to make a difference either in 
water productivity (see Equation [5]) or in land productivity (see Equation [7]).   
From a policy perspective, the results also suggest that the farm institutions related 
to input supply and extension systems need to be reoriented and strengthened, 
particularly to enhance their performance in their productivity enhancing roles.  
  The results for Equation [8] show that of the two variables expected to affect 
the feed supply potential, only CROPATEN has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on FEDSUPLY. CUSINSTN, the other institutional variable included in this 
equation has a positive but insignificant effect.  This result suggests that the cereal-
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dominated, especially paddy-dominated, crop pattern obviously contributes to feed 
and fodder supply in terms of crop residues whereas the potential roles of 
customary institutions in preserving areas and maintaining rules for open grazing 
and biomass collection need to be strengthened. This is another instance of 
institutional gaps, the correction of which requires policies and programs to revive 
and strengthen local level customary institutions for managing common pool 
resources.  The importance of enhancing the supply of feed supply from a better 
utilization of the biomass both from crop residues and from common grazing lands 
is underlined further by the results for Equation [9].  Of the two variables included 
in this equation, only FEDSUPLY is significant with the expected positive effect on 
the prospects for livestock development (LIVSTOCK).  But, TRDPOLCY, the policy-
related institutional variable capturing the effects of the policy of importing milk and 
dairy products, though widely considered to be a major deterrent for the livestock 
development in the country, is not at all significant.   
  The results for Equation [10] reveal the linkage between farm and non-farm 
activities observed in the study region.  The statistically significant positive effect of 
CROPATEN suggests that existing crop pattern dominated by food crops has a 
significant positive effect on the prospects for rural non-farm enterprises.  This is 
mainly due to the fact that most non-farm activities observed in the study region 
are linked to the processing and marketing of food crops, especially paddy.  Such 
dependence is obviously not conducive for the expansion and diversification of the 
rural non-farm sector.  Nevertheless, the significant positive effect of RDVPOLCY 
indicates that active rural development policies have the potential to substantially 
contribute to the growth and diversity of rural non-farm options.  Equation [11] 
suggests that labor productivity depends not on land productivity but mainly on 
crop pattern.  Yet the direct relation between crop pattern and labor productivity 
requires a more in-depth interpretation.
23  The lack of association between the two 
productivity variables is easy to explain. That is, with similar crop patterns and 
productivity levels, land productivity may not be able to explain the variations in 
labor productivity.  
  In Equation [12], among the three variables postulated to affect WAGERATE, 
only NFAMENTS and WAGELAWS are significant with the expected positive effects. 
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Notably, LABPRODY is not significant suggesting that prevailing wage rates are not 
closely related to labor productivity.  In contrast, non-farm activities have a strong 
effect on wage rates due to their influence on rural labor demand and thus rural 
wage levels.  Similarly, the institution of formal state regulations and informal local 
conventions governing wage levels and working conditions also have a positive 
effect wage rates.  In equation [13], all variables with the exception of WAGERATE 
have a statistically significant effect on RURALEMP.  As expected, LANPRODY and 
NFAMENTS have a positive effect whereas LIVSTOCK has a negative effect.   
Particularly, land productivity, which had an insignificant effect on labor productivity 
in Equation [11], has here a significant positive effect on rural employment.  The 
positive employment effect of NFAMENTS is consistent with the results in Equation 
[12].  The negative coefficient for LIVSTOCK suggests that livestock expansion, 
though good for rural income, has a negative effect on rural employment.
24  Though 
non-significant, the negative coefficient of WAGERATE suggests that higher wage 
rates can constrain rural employment.  
  The results for Equations [14] show that cultivation cost has a strong positive 
linkage only with the wage rate.  This is consistent with the general concern in the 
study region about the cost implications of higher wage rates.  Notably, all the 
other three variables, i.e., CROPATEN, FAMINSTN, and SUBPOLCY, have negative 
but non-significant effect on cultivation cost.  Although not significant, the negative 
effect of FAMINSTN and SUBPOLCY does suggest their potential roles in reducing 
cultivation costs. Indeed, this is another case where improving the performance of 
institutions (i.e., farm institutions, especially in terms of their roles in delivering 
farm inputs at reasonable cost and subsidy policy, especially in terms of their 
design and targeting) can enhance the development impact.  Turning to Equation 
[15], AGLINCOM, which represents the income only from farm operations, is 
influenced positively by both land productivity and cultivation cost.  The positive 
effect of CULTCOST, unlike that of LANPRODY, is unexpected, particularly given the 
prevailing concern in the study region, in particular, and the country, in general, 
regarding the economic viability of farming in the face of rising cultivation costs.  
But, it is possible to have rising levels of crop income coincided with increasing 
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cultivation costs, as long as land productivity and crop price levels have a dominant 
and neutralizing effect. 
  Equations [16] and [17] evaluate the relative size, sign, and significance of 
the relative effects of the factors influencing respectively the income levels of 
farmers and landless farm workers.  Equation [16] evaluates the relative effects of 
AGLINCOM, NFAMENTS, and LIVSTOCK on farmers’ income (FAMINCOM).  The 
results show that although all three variables are positive, only NFAMENTS and 
LIVSTOCK are significant.  This is not to be interpreted as agricultural income is 
unimportant for farmers.  What this means is the fact that with a more or less 
stable income from farming, the other two sources of income are more important in 
terms of their incremental impact on farmers’ income.  As can be seen from 
Equation [17], the incremental impact of these two income sources of farm workers 
is still more pronounced, suggesting livestock and non-farm options are much more 
important as income sources for landless workers.  Importantly, RURALEMP has a 
significant negative effect. This may be partly due to the inverse association 
between wage rates and rural employment, as seen in equation [13], and partly 
due to the fact that more farm employment reduces the days available for non-farm 
and livestock activities causing, a fall in total labor income.  Notably, SAMPOLCY, 
the variable representing payments under Samurdhi, the government’s poverty 
alleviation program meant for the poor and landless, has a positive but insignificant 
effect.  From an overall perspective, the results of equations [16] and [17] suggest 
that despite their low level of development in the study region, non-farm and 
livestock sectors are very important income sources for both small farmers and 
rural workers. 
  The next set of three equations captures the relative role and significance of 
the variables affecting respectively the three key determinants of food security, i.e., 
food production, food availability, and food prices.  In Equation [18], the 
statistically significant positive effect of CROPATEN and LANPRODY indicates that a 
crop pattern dominated by food crops and a higher level of land productivity 
contribute directly to food production.  The results for Equation [19] show that food 
production, trade policy, and market institution all have a positive effect on food 
availability.  However, of these three variables, the effects of only the first two are 
   28 
statistically significant suggesting their relative importance in determining food 
availability. The results for equation [20] are contrary to expectation because food 
production, price regulation, and market institutions, which are supposed to 
discipline food prices, are all significant with a positive effect.  However, this result 
is not entirely inconsistent as it only illustrates how food prices can continue to rise 
despite increasing food production either due to hoarding or greater gap between 
food demand and supply.  The results also suggest that the procurement, 
distribution and price related regulations as well as the market mechanisms in the 
study area are not really effective in moderating food prices.  Here is another case 
where an increase in institutional performance can vastly improve the development 
impact.    
  Equation [21] is the ultimate equation in the system, as it brings together 
various direct and indirect effects of the development, impact, and institutional 
variables flowing through all the previous equations and also link them with the 
final development goal of food security.  The results for this equation show that all 
the four variables have the expected signs, though only FOODAVAL and FOODPRIC 
are statistically significant. The positive sign for FOODAVAL, FAMINCOM, and 
LABINCOM suggests clearly that better food availability and higher income will 
directly strengthen food security. The negative sign for FOODPRIC, on the other 
hand, means that lower (higher) prices will enhance (reduce) food security.  But, as 
we consider the relative size of the coefficients, the price effect is much more 
important than the supply and income effects.  Similarly, among the income 
variables, farm income is more important than labor income.  This result is 
important as it shows that food security depends more on food prices and farm 
income than on food availability and labor income.  Since food security is stronger 
among people with access to land than among those without that access, the 
results also underlines the food security significance of the access to land and other 
assets. 
8. EVIDENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT SYNERGIES AND INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS 
So far, our attention has focused mainly on the relative role and significance of the 
development, institutional, and impact variables in each of the individual equations 
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within the system model.  But, in view of the structural linkages among the model 
equations (see Figure 6), these local or layer-specific effects of the variables also 
have impacts not only on the subsequent layers of the system but also on the 
system as a whole.  More importantly, as these impacts flow through the system, 
they can be magnified, neutralized, or even distorted by the role of other variables 
interacting in subsequent equations.  With the system model and its coefficients, it 
is possible to develop greater insights into the dynamics of the impact transmission 
process.  The dynamics of impact transmission can be evaluated both analytically 
and numerically using a reduced form single equation for the system model. This 
equation can be formed by using the structural linkages among the equations.  The 
derivation of the reduced form equation is explained in Annex C.  As can be seen, 
the reduced form equation shows food security, the ultimate dependent variable of 
the system model, as a function of all the previous equations with their 
characterizing variables and embedded linkages.   
  Since the reduced form is actually an equation of equations, when it is 
differentiated with respect to a given variable, the effect will not only be on the 
equation where this variable appears as an argument but also be on all subsequent 
equations where the dependent variable of this equation appears as an argument.  
As a result, the calculation of the total effect due to a change in a given variable 
involves either the multiplication of intermediate coefficients (when the relevant 
equations are embedded) or the addition of relevant coefficients (when the 
equations are separate).  The former involves a single channel but the latter 
involves multiple channels.  Thus, by differentiating the reduced form equation with 
respect to different variables and substituting the estimated coefficients from Table 
4, we can numerically calculate how the marginal effects of different development 
and institutional variables are being captured at each equations and how these 
captured effects are consolidated at subsequent equations to get them finally 
transmitted into the ultimate equation.  It is this exercise that is used here to trace 
the flow and quantify the impacts of development synergies and institutional effects 
on all the endogenous or dependent variables of different equations within the 
system.  The results of this exercise with respect to three development programs 
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are presented in Table 5 and the same with respect to 10 institutional variables are 
presented in Table 6. 
  While there is a derivative of the reduced form equation behind each cell in 
both tables, it will be quite complicated and lengthy to present all these derivatives. 
However, there is a simple and intuitive way to explain how the number in each cell 
of the both tables is derived in terms of the addition and/or multiplication of 
relevant coefficients from Table 4.  For instance, the first cell in the first column of 
Table 5 shows the marginal effect of system rehabilitation on bulk water supply.  
Since bulk water supply is the dependent variable in the first equation of the 
system, the marginal effect here is just the coefficient of system rehabilitation, i.e., 
0.886.  Similarly, the second cell of the first column is the marginal effect of system 
rehabilitation on crop diversification. But, going by the specification of equations [1] 
and [2], system rehabilitation affects diversification not directly but only indirectly 
via bulk water supply. Thus, using the chain rule, the relevant marginal effect will 
be 0.526, which is the product the coefficient of system rehabilitation in the first 
equation (0.886) and that of bulk water supply in the second equation (i.e., 0.594).  
Similarly, the third cell of the first column shows the marginal effect of system 
rehabilitation on crop pattern, which is transmitted indirectly via the two variables, 
i.e., bulk water supply and crop diversification.  Again, using the chain rule, this 
marginal effect (0.231) is obtained by multiplying the coefficients of system 
rehabilitation in the first equation (0.884), that of bulk water supply (0.526) from 
the second equation, and that crop diversification (0.438) from the third equation.  
Similar procedure of multiplication in the case of indirect effects and addition in the 
case of multiple effects are used to obtain the values of marginal effects in the 
remaining cells of Table 5.  Needless to add, similar explanation also applies to the 
values in Table 6.  Let us also note that in both tables, we also reported the row 
and column totals. The row total indicates the total impacts captured by each of the 
21 endogenous variables whereas the column total indicates the total impacts 
generated by the development programs in Table 5 and that by the institutional 
variables in Table 6. 
  Table 5 shows the size and flow of the marginal impacts of the three 
development programs across the equations.  These marginal impacts cover both 
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the effects of synergies among the programs and the effects of improved 
effectiveness and performance of individual programs.  Notice, however, that the 
flow of the synergy among the programs is unidirectional, i.e., from system 
rehabilitation to bulk water policy and, then, from the latter to crop diversification.  
This is essentially due to the particular way the interactions among the programs 
are modeled.  That is, the system rehabilitation is considered to facilitate bulk water 
delivery and the latter, in turn, to influence crop diversification, but crop 
diversification is modeled to influence neither of the other programs. Considering 
this fact, the value of synergy derived by BULKWATD from system rehabilitation is 
0.886.  But, CROPDIVR derives synergies both directly from bulk water delivery 
policy (i.e., 0.594) and also indirectly from system rehabilitation (i.e., 0.526). The 
value of direct synergy is simply the value of coefficient for BULKWATD in Equation 
[2] whereas the value for the indirect synergy is obtained by multiplying the 
coefficients of SYSREHAB (0.886) in Equation [1] and BULKWATD (0.594) in 
Equation [2].  Since crop diversification, unlike bulk water delivery policy, has two 
routes for synergies, its total development synergy is equal to 1.200.  As a result, 
crop diversification receives more synergy than that of bulk water delivery policy.  
However, the development externalities for both bulk water delivery policy and crop 
diversification are substantial and from a policy perspective, they can be improved 
with a better and more effective monitoring and implementation of related 
development programs. 
  More importantly, the development synergies flow throughout the system 
because they are being captured by many, if not all, the intermediate variables and 
finally transmitted to the ultimate variabl e  o f  f o o d  s e c u r i t y .   A s  n o t e d  a b o v e ,  
besides the synergy effects, these variables also capture the effects of 
improvement in the performance of the individual programs as well.  That is, the 
effects captured by the intermediary and final variables are actually the combined 
effects of both the individual and collective performance of the three programs with 
an effective implementation and coordination.  In Table 5, the combined effects as 
well as the sum of the total effects derived by some of the variables are substantial 
while those derived by others are very small.  For instance, water institution derives 
the highest combined effects from both system rehabilitation (0.754) and bulk 
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water delivery (0.851).  On the other hand, food security, food availability, food 
price, farmers’ income, and labor productivity capture relatively less of the impacts 
of all the three programs. In terms of the total synergy derived from all the 
programs, land productivity comes first with the value of 2.206, followed by water 
institution (1.605), cultivation cost (1.350), labor income (1.306), and water 
productivity (1.287).  Among the programs, in terms of their total synergy effects, 
bulk water delivery policy with a value of 7.200 is relatively more important than 
the other two with a value of around 6.500. 
  Table 6 shows the size and flow of the impacts of the institutional variables, 
which are exogenous to the model.
25 The impacts of these variables are captured 
both directly and indirectly by the 21 endogenous variables or the dependent 
variables of the 21 equations.  The institutional variables obviously differ in terms 
of their interaction with the development and impact variables depending on their 
location in the impact pathways.  As a result, the impacts of some institutional 
variables are captured in many equations while the impacts of others are captured 
only in few equations, especially those capturing the interactions further down the 
impact pathway.  For instance, land tenure, customary institution, and farm 
institution affect almost all the equations, but market institution, price regulation, 
trade policy, subsidy policy, and Samurdhi policy affect only few equations.  The 
total impacts generated by the institutional variables affecting many equations are 
likely to be larger than those affecting only a few equations.   
  In terms of their relative impacts on food security, some of the institutional 
variables affecting a few equations (e.g., market institution, price regulation, and 
trade policy) have a relatively larger impact than those affecting many equations.  
These results highlight two very important aspects.  First is the role of impact 
dissipation within the impact transmission process due to their long impact chains, 
weak impact links, and en route impact distortions.  Second is the role of relative 
proximity or shorter impact chains associated with a few institutional variables to 
the final and proximate goals.  It is the impact dissipation that explains why the 
institutional variables related to land tenure, custom, and farm input supply and 
extension could not sustain their substantial initial impacts.  On the other hand, it is 
the role of relative proximity that explains why the institutions related to market, 
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price, wage, and trade have a larger impact on food security.  From a policy 
perspective, while it is important to focus on institutions with proximate effects, it is 
important to address the issue of impact dissipation by locating and strengthening 
the weak links.  From the results in Table 3, it is possible to locate these weak links 
by looking at what variables have caused such dissipation in which equation. 
  From an overall perspective, the results in Table 6 suggests that the 
institutions having a major impact on food security are market institution, trade 
policy, price regulation, and wage laws.  This is mainly due to their direct impact on 
food supply, food price, and wage income.  Notably, despite their positive 
intermediary impacts, the food security impacts of land tenure, rural development 
policy, and subsidy policy are all negative, suggesting their ineffectiveness.   
Although customary institution, farm institution, and land tenure have a larger 
impact on the system as a whole, their food security impact is either low or 
negative.  Among them, customary institutions are not that easy to change through 
deliberate policies while land tenure is politically difficult to change.  Practical 
considerations require a greater policy attention on the reorientation of farm input 
and extension institutions, which are likely to be easier to change.  This is 
particularly so given the substantial contributions that farm institutions can 
potentially make.   
  As we compare the total effects of development programs and institutions as 
captured by different endogenous variables in tables 5 and 6, we find the 
development impacts are more than the institutional effects in most cases.  Notably, 
in the case of water institution, the total institutional impact is even negative.  But, 
it is interesting to note that in seven cases including food security and some of its 
proximate variables the total effects derived from institutions are more than that 
derived form development programs.  This clearly suggests the critical role that 
institutions play in the generation and transmission of development impacts. Finally, 
besides its role in providing evidence for development synergies and institutional 
impacts, the numerical analysis impact transmission reported here also has a major 
policy role.  The numerical analysis can be a basis for identifying the weak links 
within the impact transmission process, including the development, institutional, 
and impact variables involved in such weak links. The same analysis can also rank 
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the variables in terms of the magnitude of their marginal impacts and intensity of 
their linkages within the system.  Such information is valuable for targeting impact 
channels and prioritizing variables in development planning and implementation. 
9. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper has argued that the impact synergies among development programs and 
the impact enhancing role of institutions, though well known, have neither been 
properly treated nor fully accounted for in actual development planning, 
implementation, and evaluation.  This problem has far reaching implications, 
especially for meta-development goals such as MDGs, which require effective 
institutions and an integrated approach to development planning and 
implementation for their realization.  It is demonstrated graphically how the 
ignorance of the impact synergies among past, ongoing, and planned programs 
leads to biased impact assessment and how an insufficient treatment of the impact 
enhancing role of institutions leads to substantial welfare loss.  To help address 
these serious problems, this paper has presented one approach for developing an 
evaluation methodology and also illustrated it in the empirical context of the Kala 
Oya Basin in Sri Lanka, using stakeholder-based information.  Although the 
illustration here has considered the linkages among water-related programs, the 
methodology is generalizable to deal with more general linkages not only among 
other development programs but also other projects or policies having a common 
or closely related development goal.  
  The analytics of the institution-impact framework shows both the specific 
point at which different institutions influence the impact generation and 
transmission process as well as the mechanics of impact synergies among the past, 
ongoing, and planned programs.  The mathematical replica of this framework 
provides additional insights into the functional relations and sequential linkages 
among the development, institutional, and impact variables.  Evaluation of these 
analytics, mechanics, and linkages are valuable can be a basis for development 
design and implementation, especially in the packaging and sequencing programs 
and in the identification and strengthening of pathways and institutional 
configurations with major impact potential.  The regression results provide 
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considerable insights into the specific roles that institutions play in the generation 
and transmission of impacts across impact pathways as well as the extent of impact 
synergies that development programs derive from each other.  These development 
synergies are captured not only by the coefficients of the variables representing the 
development programs but also by those of the other impact and institutional 
variables.  Since these coefficients are the statistical representation of the 
consensus prevalent among the selected stakeholders, their size, direction, and 
significance show the relative importance of the development, impact, and 
institutional variables included in the model.  By unbundling the impact process and 
deciphering its transmission channels, the system model is also able to capture the 
flow and direction of development impacts as well as to show which institutions 
affect what channel.  The sensitivity analysis performed with the reduced form 
equation has also shed light on the flow of development synergies and institutional 
impacts both at the layer-specific and system-wide contexts.  All these are valuable 
information for policy design, institutional analysis, and impact assessment. 
  From a policy perspective, the main message is that when planning a new 
development program, project, or policy for a given region, it is crucial to take 
stock of the potential synergies possible from past, ongoing, and planned programs, 
projects, or policies with common or closely related goals.  In our study region, for 
example, the implementation of system rehabilitation has had a substantial 
facilitating impact on the performance of bulk water distribution and this positive 
synergy has the potential to enhance the prospects for crop diversification.  The 
results also indicate that the development synergies among the programs can be 
enhanced with a fine-tuning of the legal, policy, and organizational components of 
institutions related to the land, water, agriculture, market, and trade spheres.   
Although the institutions covered here are not exhaustive, the results do show that 
among the institutions considered, those operating in the production and marketing 
spheres are relatively more important in terms of their role in channeling the 
impacts to the ultimate goal of food security.  Specifically, since food prices and 
farm income are the most dominant factors affecting food security, all their 
intermediary variables and their underlying institutions (e.g., markets, price 
regulation, land tenure, and credit and extension) are very important. 
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  Besides the production-related farm institutions and distribution-related 
market institutions, there are also major influences from national level policies and 
laws such as those related to farm subsidy, rural industrialization, poverty 
alleviation, and wage rates and working conditions.  But, at the same time, 
customary institutions related to cultivation practices and common grazing lands 
have significant effects on crop choice and livestock development.  Notably, 
customary tendencies towards paddy cultivation, though a serious constraint for 
crop diversification, have a positive effect on the supply side of food security. To 
what extent changes in the performance of these rural institutions could affect the 
ultimate goal can be evaluated in terms of chain functions capturing how a marginal 
change in any of the institutions leads to a series changes within the equation 
systems and culminates finally in the marginal change in food security.  Similarly, 
how impact synergies among development programs contribute to the final goal 
can also be evaluated in terms of the marginal changes in one or more of the 
variables characterizing various impact chains.  Sensitivity analysis of this nature 
can provide valuable information for policy makers in prioritizing institutions and 
sequencing development programs. 
  From an overall perspective, the econometric property and theoretical 
consistency of the model results also suggest the proposed methodology of 
institution-impact interaction to be highly robust and the empirical approach of 
using perception-based information to be very reasonable.  While the methodology 
and empirical approach are intuitive and the results provide considerable insights 
into the internal dynamics of and institutional roles in impact transmission, one 
cannot ignore the limitations of the present attempt and the scope for further 
refinements.  Some of the limitations are obviously related to the specification and 
structuring of equations.  The unexpected signs for and insignificance of crucial 
variables in some equations are also problems that can be avoided with a more 
refined specification of equations.  Although only the perception-based qualitative 
data is used here to provide an empirical demonstration of evaluation approach, it 
is possible to explore ways for using observed and quantitative data from secondary 
sources and household surveys for as many variables as possible.  In this case, a 
mix of quantitative and qualitative data can be used to estimate the model.  More 
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importantly, although the methodology can work well with a reasonable number of 
programs and impact pathways, it can become complicated when they are 
increased beyond a certain level.  Despite these limitations, the paper is still able to 
develop and empirically illustrate an evaluation methodology that can deal with the 
issues of impact synergies and institutional roles in the practical contexts 
development planning, implementation, and impact assessment.  
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ENDNOTES 
1 Note that the development synergies can be both positive and negative, depending on the 
nature of the development programs considered together. These synergies relate only to 
the enhanced or reduced welfare effects of one program due to the externalities from the 
other programs.  Thus, these synergies capture the difference between the sums of their 
individual impacts when implemented in isolation and their joint impacts when 
implemented and evaluated together. 
2 The MDGs, which came from the Millennium Declaration adopted in 2000 by all 189 UN 
member states, set targets for countries to reduce poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, and 
gender bias and improve environmental sustainability and global governance by 2015.   
These targets are now accepted by the international development and donor agencies as a 
framework for monitoring development progress 
(http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/index.html).  
3 For instance, in the case of the food security impact of an irrigation project, one pathway 
can be characterized by the chain of variables, i.e., irrigation—productivity—food output—
food availability—food prices—food security. Besides this output pathway, there is also an 
income pathway, i.e., irrigation—cropping intensity—employment—wages—income—food 
security.  More such paths can also be visualized and constructed.  Note that these paths 
enable us to incorporate also the role of relevant institutional variables (e.g., production, 
extension, input, and market institutions, price regulations, and trade and rural 
development policies). This is illustrated in Figure 5 (where the pathways are traced and 
depicted) and in the system model (where they are formally characterized as equations). 
4 For instance, a review of the available approaches, as presented and evaluated by Baker 
(2000), Bourguignon and de Silva (2003), and Center for Global Development (2006), 
suggests that their main application is with respect to an individual project, policy, or 
program, their evaluation confines to isolated impacts, and their focus is on the ultimate 
policy goal or few of their intermediaries. 
5 Of them, system rehabilitation was already implemented, but bulk water distribution is 
being implemented only on a pilot scale in the canal areas of the basin.  Crop 
diversification, is only being planned, though the Government of Sri Lanka has a national 
policy to promote agricultural diversification. 
6 MAPP is a stakeholder-centred method involving an open approach and a seven-step 
procedure where the stakeholders are asked to award points on various aspects and 
criteria related to one or more development programs and their impacts on development 
goals.  See Neubert (2000 and 2006) for a detailed description of this method. 
7 PSIA is a method for evaluating the distributional consequences of policy reforms on 
different groups in terms of the direct and indirect as well as the immediate and future 
impacts as transmitted through channels such as: prices and wages, employment, access 
to goods and services, assets, transfers and taxes, and authority. To account for the 
temporal differences and varying nature in the flow of reform impacts, the method 
combines secondary data and objective and perceptional data from a sample of intended 
beneficiaries/losers. See the Department of International Development and World Bank 
(2005) and Coudouel, Dani, and Paternostro (2006) for the description and application of 
this method. 
8 Although the PSIA is originally intended to be participatory, with an excessive focus on 
objective data and scientific quality, it has tended to become more technocratic (Coudouel, 
Dani, and Paternostro, 2006:12), making it unable to capture the valuable information 
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held by stakeholders—both beneficiaries as well as those involved in development 
research, planning, and implementation. 
9 A general application of this framework for a global ranking of institutional health and 
reform prospects within the water sector is illustrated in Dinar and Saleth (2005). 
10 For instance, in the case of water development program, we have included only five main 
paths, though, in reality, each of these paths will affect the development goals through 
several routes. For instance, the irrigation path will have different but related routes such 
as production route (i.e., irrigation-cropping intensity-productivity-food supply), income 
route (irrigation-productivity-employment-income), price routes (irrigation-production-
food prices), resource routes (irrigation-waterlogging-salinity-land  degradations), etc.   
Similar routes and the associated chain of variables can also be found for the other four 
impact paths.   
11 In the impact routes characterized by different chains of variables (see note 3), it is 
possible to include relevant institutional variables.  For instance, production, input, and 
extension-related institutional variables can be added with the impact variables 
characterizing the production route.  Similarly, institutional variables related to market, 
trade, and price regulation can be added with the impact variables underlying the price 
route.  This will help us to formally and functionally capture the direct and interactive 
effects of the impact and institutional variables on the intermediary and final goals.  We 
will see this more clearly in Section 5.   
12 These programs were actually selected from a list of 16 programs based on the priority 
points of the sample stakeholders. The list included both the completed, ongoing, and 
potentially relevant programs in the particular context of the study region. 
13 Note that some components of this environment (e.g., development policy, production 
relations, and institutional and macro policy aspects) are internalized within the flow chart. 
Although the effects of other such factors (e.g., climatic change and national and 
international political environment) are not considered in Figure 5, it is possible to 
evaluate them by comparing the institution-impact relations under different scenarios 
representing the status of these exogenous factors.       
14 The impact variables are actually the economic, technical, and physical variables that act 
as the ‘impact transmission variables’. They are not to be confused with those in the 
impact assessment literature, where ‘impact variables’ relate only to the ultimate end-
goals (see Neubert, 2000).  In the context of our framework, it is still appropriate to treat 
them as impact variables because (a) they do capture the intermediary impacts (or, 
outcomes) and (b) such impacts are specifically evaluated using equations representing 
different impact layers. 
15 Notice that the 17 impact variables also include the four variables, i.e., farm income, 
wage income, food availability, and food price, which are actually the intermediate goals 
linked immediately with the final goal of food security. 
16 Note that in the case of quantitative variables (e.g., productivity, income, employment, 
and food consumption, these scores can be easily converted into quantitative equivalents 
by using the range of minimum and maximum values observed in the study area. But, in 
the context of cross-sectional regression and when using with qualitative variables (e.g., 
the performance and effects of most institutional variables) where performance scores are 
indispensable, the results will not be qualitative different whether one uses the scores or 
their quantitative equivalent for the quantitative variables. 
17 The order condition requires that in the case of each equation, the number of excluded 
exogenous variables is greater than the number of included endogenous variables less one.  
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In simple terms, this condition ensures that there are enough exogenous variables 
excluded so that they can serve as instrumental variables for estimating the endogenous 
variable appearing as the dependent variable in each equation. The rank condition, though 
quite technical, requires, in simple terms, that all the equations are distinct in the sense 
that none of them can be formed with the linear combinations any other two equations in 
the system (see Kennedy, 1987: 138 & 142). 
18 Notably, these stakeholders are not the direct beneficiaries of the development programs. 
This is partly to avoid the potential bias and partly to address the macro-micro dichotomy 
evident in empirical impact evaluation literature, i.e., micro evaluations report 
considerable impact whereas macro evaluations find little or no impact, or vice versa 
(Neubert, 2000; Coudouel, Dani, and Paternostro, 2006).  
19 In view of the technical nature of the analytical framework and questions, the original 
plan was to have a sample of only government officials and researchers.  However, we 
also tried to test whether the questionnaire can be administered to farmers and 
community leaders.  This is how the three farmers and community leaders were added to 
the sample.  As the experience shows that they are able to understand and answer the 
questions well, the present exercise can very well be repeated with a sample exclusively 
of farmers and local leaders.  
20 Note that instead of the simple average, it is also possible to use weighted average based 
on a principal component analysis.  But, simple averages are used essentially to have a 
more balanced and unbiased values for the variables. 
21 To test for multicollinearity, a correlation analysis was performed for the 32 variables.  
The correlation matrix showed that only in four cases (SYSREHAB vs. BULKWATD and 
WATINSTN, RURALEMP vs. FEEDSUPLY, and AGLINCOM vs. FAMINCOM) did the correlation 
coefficient was over the threshold of r>0.5 (see Hair et al. 1995).  Since none of them 
were used together as independent variables in any equation, the multicollinearity can be 
taken not as a serious problem. 
22 The result is somewhat surprising because the bulk water provision, as being piloted in 
the study region, is only to farmer groups and not to individual farmers as needed for 
promoting independent crop decisions. 
23 Note that the strong positive effect of CROPATEN on LABPRODY cannot be interpreted 
simply as food crops are more conducive for labor productivity.  It needs to be explained 
in the light of the inverse relation between WAGERATE and RURALEMP seen in Equation 
[13], which means that high wage limits labor use and with a given farm productivity, 
lesser labor use causes labor productivity to be higher than otherwise.  It is this effect 
occurring in the face of a labor scarcity and paddy domination that is behind the positive 
association seen between CROPATEN and LABPRODY. 
24 The inverse relation between RURALEMP and LIVSTOCK suggests the tradeoff in labor 
time allocation between wage employment and livestock rearing, which is particularly so 
among the groups which need both sources of income.  
25 It is important to note that even though bulk water delivery policy and water institution 
are part of institutions, they remain only endogenous because the former is specified as a 
function of system rehabilitation and the later is specified as a function of bulk water 
delivery policy. 
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Figure 2: Conceptual Frame for Institution-impact Interface 
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Development Program 2 (Introduction of New Crop Varieties) 
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Note: $$$ = Values of actual or perception-based information on one or more variables designed to capture both the 
status and effectiveness of each of the institutional aspects as well as the level of impacts on each of the food 
security aspects.   
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Table 1: Variables in the Institution-impact Model 
Categories of 
Variables 
No  Names of Variables  Acronym 
Used 
Development Goal  1  Food Security  FOODSECT 
1 System  Rehabilitation SYSREHAB 
2 Bulk  Water  Distribution  BULKWATD 
Development Programs 
3 Crop  Diversification  CROPDIVR 
1 Crop  Pattern  CROPATEN 
2 Land  Productivity  LANPRODY 
3 Water  Productivity  WATPRODY 
4 Labor  Productivity  LABPRODY 
5 Rural  Employment  RURALEMP 
6 Wage  Rates  WAGERATE 
7 Cultivation  Costs  CULTCOST 
8 Agricultural  Income  AGLINCOM 
9  Land Quality/soil Health  LANHELTH 
10 Food  Production  FOODPROD 
11 Non-farm  Enterprises  NFAMENTS 
12  Fodder & Feed Supply  FEDSUPLY 
13 Livestock/Poultry  LIVSTOCK 
14 Farm  Income  FAMINCOM 
15 Labor  Income  LABINCOM 
16 Food  Availability  FOODAVAL 
Impact Variables 
17 Food  Price  FOODPRIC 
1 Land  Tenure  LANTENUR 
2 Water  Institutions  WATINSTN 
3 Customary  Institutions  CUSINSTN 
4 Farm  Input  Institutions  FAMINSTN 
5 Market  Institutions  MKTINSTN 
6 Price  Regulations  PRICREGL 
7 Wage/Labor  Legislations  WAGELAWS 
8  Rural Development Policy  RDVPOLCY 
9 Trade  Policy  TRDPOLCY 
10  Farm Subsidy Policy  SUBPOLCY 
Institutional Variables 







Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Model Variables 
No Endogenous 
Variables 
Mean Standard  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
1 BULKWATD  6.32  1.75  1.00  9.00 
2 CROPDIVR  6.04  1.79  2.00  10.00 
3 CROPATEN  5.60  1.00  2.79  7.57 
4 WATINSTN  5.03  1.88  1.00  9.00 
5 WATPRODY  7.29  1.42  4.00  10.00 
6 LANHELTH  7.62  1.33  3.50  10.00 
7 LANPRODY  6.84  1.40  2.63  10.00 
8 FEDSUPLY  5.32  1.43  1.00  8.00 
9 LIVSTOCK  3.64  1.62  0.90  7.90 
10 NFAMENTS  7.07  1.29  2.25  9.50 
11 LABPRODY  4.94  2.21  1.00  9.00 
12 WAGERATE  6.10  1.27  2.50  8.50 
13 RURALEMP  5.31  2.08  1.00  10.00 
14 CULTCOST  5.66  1.68  1.00  8.00 
15 AGLINCOM  6.90  1.49  3.00  10.00 
16 FAMINCOM  5.50  1.09  3.00  9.00 
17 LABINCOM  4.64  1.31  2.00  8.00 
18 FOODPROD  5.22  1.23  2.33  7.67 
19 FOODAVAL  5.24  1.36  2.50  8.50 
20 FOODPRIC  4.37  1.31  1.50  7.50 
21 FOODSECT  5.07  1.59  0.75  8.00 
No Endogenous 
Variables 
Mean Standard  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
1 SYSREHAB  6.75  1.19  1.67  8.83 
2 LANTENUR  6.20  1.15  3.56  8.33 
3 CUSINSTN  4.71  1.28  1.40  7.60 
4 FAMINSTN  5.52  1.68  1.00  9.00 
5 MKTINSTN  5.10  1.35  1.67  9.33 
6 PRICREGL  4.62  1.57  1.00  8.75 
7 WAGELAWS  3.51  1.74  1.00  8.50 
8 RDVPOLCY  5.07  1.85  1.50  9.00 
9 TRDPOLCY  6.57  1.41  3.00  9.00 
10 SUBPOLCY  6.82  1.38  3.00  10.00 
























BULKWATD 0.317  1.485  0.146  0.395 
SYSREHAB -0.053  -0.152  0.880  -0.070 
CROPDIVR -0.038  -0.251  0.803  -0.045 
CROPATEN -0.267  -0.652  0.519  -0.295 
WATINSTN 0.255  1.351  0.185  0.253 
WATPRODY 0.013  0.056  0.955  0.018 
LANHELTH -0.212  -0.864  0.393  -0.318 
LANPRODY -0.135  -0.459  0.649  -0.182 
FEDSUPLY 0.124  0.554  0.583  0.130 
LIVSTOCK -0.111  -0.633  0.531  -0.080 
NFAMENTS 0.057  0.258  0.798  0.080 
LABPRODY 0.253  1.606  0.117  0.247 
WAGERATE 0.506  1.752  0.088  0.610 
RURALEMP 0.077  0.475  0.637  0.081 
CULTCOST 0.125  0.715  0.479  0.140 
AGLINCOM -0.785  -2.707  0.010  -1.068 
FAMINCOM 1.128  2.910  0.006  1.225 
LABINCOM 0.452  1.907  0.065  0.414 
FOODPROD -0.118  -0.342  0.735  -0.122 
FOODAVAL 0.125  0.487  0.629  0.129 
FOODPRIC -0.215  -0.898  0.375  -0.185 
LANTENUR -0.139  -0.613  0.544  -0.170 
CUSINSTN -0.102  -0.402  0.690  -0.095 
FAMINSTN -0.129  -0.618  0.540  -0.141 
MKTINSTN -0.253  -1.184  0.244  -0.255 
PRICREGL -0.003  -0.020  0.984  -0.003 
WAGELAWS -0.053  -0.256  0.800  -0.037 
RDVPOLCY 0.107  0.634  0.530  0.108 
TRDPOLCY 0.184  0.729  0.471  0.239 
SUBPOLCY -0.134  -0.720  0.476  -0.180 
FOODSECT 







Table 4: System Model of Institution-Impact Interaction: 3-SLS Results 
 
Eqn. Dependent Independent  Estimated  Asymptotic  Level of  Elasticity  R
2 
No Variables  Variables  Coefficient  T-Ratio  Significance  at Means    
[1] BULKWATD SYSREHAB  0.886  10.240  0.000  0.947 0.333 
      LANTENUR  0.056  0.591  0.555  0.055   
[2] CROPDIVR  BULKWATD  0.594  5.993  0.000  0.621 -0.366 
      FAMINSTN  0.385  3.572  0.000  0.352   
[3] CROPATEN CROPDIVR  0.438  7.381  0.000  0.473 -0.354 
      LANTENUR  0.141  1.897  0.058  0.156   
      CUSINSTN  0.446  7.107  0.000  0.375   
[4] WATINSTN BULKWATD  0.851  6.548  0.000  1.068 0.148 
      LANTENUR  -0.014  -0.097  0.923  -0.017   
      CUSINSTN  -0.058  -0.465  0.642  -0.054   
[5] WATPRODY CROPATEN  1.099  8.446  0.000  0.845 -0.104 
      WATINSTN  0.167  1.174  0.240  0.115   
      FAMINSTN  0.047  0.553  0.581  0.036   
[6] LANHELTH  CROPATEN  1.000  4.747  0.000  0.736 -0.089 
      WATPRODY  0.358  2.450  0.014  0.343   
      LANTENUR  -0.102  -0.800  0.424  -0.083   
[7] LANPRODY CROPATEN  0.520  2.323  0.020  0.425 0.285 
      LANHELTH  0.584  4.039  0.000  0.650   
      FAMINSTN  -0.093  -1.515  0.130  -0.075   
[8] FEDSUPLY  CROPATEN  0.821  7.167  0.000  0.864 -0.004 
      CUSINSTN  0.152  1.160  0.246  0.134   
[9] LIVSTOCK  FEDSUPLY  0.613  3.295  0.001  0.901 -0.686 
      TRDPOLCY  0.028  0.192  0.847  0.052   
[10] NFAMENTS  CROPATEN  1.164  20.910  0.000  0.922 -0.471 
      RDVPOLCY  0.107  2.001  0.045  0.076   
[11] LABPRODY  LANPRODY  -0.425  -1.230  0.219  -0.588 0.223 
      CROPATEN  1.413  3.354  0.001  1.602   
[12] WAGERATE  LABPRODY  0.138  1.158  0.247  0.111 -0.122 
      NFAMENTS  0.650  8.605  0.000  0.753   
      WAGELAWS  0.222  2.969  0.003  0.128   
[13] RURALEMP  LANPRODY  0.671  1.282  0.200  0.865 -0.120 
      WAGERATE  -0.450  -1.474  0.141  -0.517   
      NFAMENTS  0.752  1.847  0.065  1.001   
      LIVSTOCK  -0.515  -2.931  0.003  -0.351   
[14] CULTCOST  CROPATEN  -0.066  -0.134  0.893  -0.065 -0.337 
      WAGERATE  1.048  1.905  0.057  1.130   
      FAMINSTN  -0.017  -0.105  0.916  -0.017   









Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Eqn Dependent Independent  Estimated  Asymptotic  Level of  Elasticity  R
2 
No Variables  Variables  Coefficient  T-Ratio  Significance  at Means    
[15] AGLINCOM  LANPRODY  0.609  3.963  0.000  0.605 0.030 
      CULTCOST  0.394  2.909  0.004  0.323   
      MKTINSTN  0.097  0.950  0.342  0.072   
[16] FAMINCOM  AGLINCOM  0.136  1.131  0.258  0.170 0.116 
      NFAMENTS  0.437  3.773  0.000  0.561   
      LIVSTOCK  0.412  6.153  0.000  0.271   
[17] LABINCOM  RURALEMP  -0.437  -2.545  0.011  -0.501 -0.649 
      NFAMENTS  0.550  2.560  0.010  0.839   
      LIVSTOCK  0.778  5.153  0.000  0.608   
      SAMPOLCY  0.061  0.758  0.449  0.067   
[18] FOODPROD CROPATEN  0.823  5.501  0.000  0.883 0.400 
      LANPRODY  0.312  1.949  0.051  0.409   
      WATPRODY  -0.206  -2.115  0.034  -0.287   
[19] FOODAVAL  FOODPROD  0.451  2.816  0.005  0.449 0.149 
      TRDPOLCY  0.319  3.629  0.000  0.400   
      MKTINSTN  0.160  1.426  0.154  0.156   
[20] FOODPRIC  FOODPROD  0.474  4.329  0.000  0.566 0.096 
      PRICREGL  0.131  1.812  0.070  0.139   
      MKTINSTN  0.257  2.504  0.012  0.300   
[21] FOODSECT  FOODAVAL  0.520  2.280  0.023  0.538 -0.670 
      FOODPRIC  -0.965  -2.932  0.003  -0.833   
      FAMINCOM  0.767  1.603  0.109  0.833   
      LABINCOM  0.507  1.622  0.105  0.465   
Sample Size  67 
Endogenous Variables   21 
Exogenous Variables  11 
System R
2  0.878 
Chi-Square (with 61 degrees of freedom, P=0.000)  140.9 
Notes:  (a) This model is estimated with no constant term in all equations.  
  (b) Bold coefficients are significant at 10 percent or better.   
  (c) Elasticity at means are the weighted coefficients with the weights being the ratio of the 
means of the concerned dependent and independent variables, This standardization 
enables a comparison of the relative importance of the independent variables both 
within and across equations. 
  (d) Unlike OLS, where R
2 has the range of 0-1, the R
2 in the case of 3-SLS can range from 
-∞ to 1. The relevant statistics to be considered in the case of 3-SLS estimation are 
the System R
2, which captures the explanatory power of the model as a whole and 





Table 5: Size and Flow of Development Impacts and Synergies 
















BULKWATD  y1   0.886 -  -  0.886 
CROPDIVR  y2   0.526 0.594  -  1.120 
CROPATEN  y3   0.231 0.261 0.438  0.930 
WATINSTN  y4   0.754 0.851  -  1.605 
WATPRODY  y5   0.379 0.427 0.481  1.287 
LANHELTH  y6   0.366 0.346 0.172  0.884 
LANPRODY  y7   0.334 1.289 0.583  2.206 
FEDSUPLY  y8   0.189 0.213 0.395  0.797 
LIVSTOCK  y9   0.116 0.130 0.220  0.466 
NFAMENTS  y10   0.268 0.302 0.509  1.079 
LABPRODY  y11  0.374 0.035 0.522  0.931 
WAGERATE  y12  0.280 0.310 0.484  1.074 
RURALEMP  y13  0.229 0.261 0.426  0.916 
CULTCOST  y14  0.278 0.417 0.655  1.350 
AGLINCOM  y15  0.313 0.106 0.166  0.585 
FAMINCOM  y16  0.262 0.081 0.137  0.480 
LABINCOM  y17  0.275 0.782 0.249  1.306 
FOODPROD  y18  0.239 0.296 0.390  0.925 
FOODAVAL  y19  0.108 0.133 0.176  0.417 
FOODPRIC  y20  0.113 0.140 0.185  0.438 
FOODSECT  y21  0.011 0.226 0.395  0.632 







Table 6: Size and Flow of Institutional Impacts 








BULKWATD  y1   0.056  - - -  - -  - - - -  0.056 
CROPDIVR  y2   0.033  0.385  - -  - -  - - - -  0.418 
CROPATEN  y3   0.156  0.446  0.169  -  - -  - - - -  0.771 
WATINSTN  y4   0.034  -0.058  - -  - -  - - - -  -0.024 
WATPRODY  y5   0.177  0.481  0.232  -  - -  - - - -  0.890 
LANHELTH  y6   0.117  0.618  0.252  -  - -  - - - -  0.987 
LANPRODY  y7   0.149  0.593  0.142  -  - -  - - - -  0.884 
FEDSUPLY  y8   0.128  0.518  0.139  -  - -  - - - -  0.785 
LIVSTOCK  y9   0.078  0.318  0.085 -  -  -     0.028 -  - 0.509 
NFAMENTS  y10   0.181  0.519  0.196  -  - -  0.107  - - -  1.003 
LABPRODY  y11  0.145  0.648  0.129  -  - -  - - - -  0.922 
WAGERATE  y12  0.119  0.493  0.111  -  -  0.222  0.015  - - -  0.960 
RURALEMP  y13  0.140 0.391 0.148  -  -  -0.114 0.073 -0.013  -  -  0.879 
CULTCOST  y14  0.114  0.487  0.088  -  - 0.233  0.016  - -0.045 -  0.427 
AGLINCOM  y15  0.136  0.553  0.121  0.097 - 0.092  0.006  - -0.018 -  0.987 
FAMINCOM  y16  0.146 0.498 0.147 0.040  -  0.038 0.049 0.004  -0.007  -  0.915 
LABINCOM  y17  0.174  0.451  0.186 -  -  -0.089  0.116  -0.022  - 0.061  0.877 
FOODPROD  y18  0.152  0.395  0.182  -  - -  - - - -  0.729 
FOODAVAL  y19  0.069 0.178 0.082 0.319  -  -  -  0.160  -  -  0.808 
FOODPRIC  y20  0.072  0.187  0.086  0.131  0.257  -  - - - -  0.733 
FOODSECT  y21  -0.003 0.055  0.004  0.332 0.130 0.106  -0.086 0.146 -0.004 0.059  0.739 





ANNEX A: TECHNICAL NOTES 
 
Institutional Ecology Principle: This principle extends the ‘ecosystem’ concept to 
institutional systems to analytically show (a) the linkages and synergies among 
institutions across domains (law, policy, and organization), spheres (land, water, 
agricultural, rural, and environmental), and scales (basin, region, and national) and 
(b) the nested and embedded character of institutions within the social, economic, 
political, and resource systems. 
Institutional Decomposition and Analysis Framework:  T h i s  f r a m e w o r k  
unbundles institutions into a set of interrelated rules, characterizes them using 
quantitative and qualitative variables, and formalizes the relations and linkages 
among these rules (Saleth and Dinar, 2004).  The approach is similar in spirit to the 
Institutional Analysis and Development framework developed by Ostrom (1990) for 
application to local level institutions for common pool resources management. 
Ex-ante Approach: This approach tries to evaluate the futuristic changes and 
expectation aspects related to institutions based on the convergence in 
stakeholders’ perception.  Such consensual perception can summarize objective 
evaluation, learned judgments, aspirations, and expectations of participating 
stakeholders.  Unlike the post mortem approach underlying the ex-post evaluation 
and analysis, the ex-ante approach is very useful for designing anticipatory and 
coping strategies that would allow enough lead time for policy/program 
adjustments and modifications. 
Adaptive Instrumental Evaluation:  Unlike other evaluation approaches in 
economics relying on normative and absolute concepts such as ‘efficiency’ based on 
the assumption of individual rationality and perfect information, the adaptive 
instrumental evaluation is based on a positive and relative approach (Tool, 1977; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Bromley, 1985).  It allows the evaluation of 
events/aspects with respect to relevant reference points (e.g., best practices, 
desirable conditions, and stated objectives) rather than with respect to ideals or 
absolute conditions.  It also allows the reference points to be flexible and 
changeable within the evaluation process itself (Saleth and Dinar, 2004).  This 
approach is very pertinent for evaluating aspects such as institutions and their 






ANNEX B: SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
“THE INSTITUTIONAL MATRIX OF THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FOOD SECURITY GOALS IN KALA OYA BASIN, SRI LANKA” 
 





(1)  The conceptual framework is generic, but captures as much as possible the relevant 
aspects of KOB basin in particular and Sri Lanka in general; 
(2)  It is focused on the impact of the three development programs on food security, 
particularly from the perspective of small farmers, farm workers, and other rural poor; 
(3)  ‘Impact pathways’ are the routes through the economic impacts of development 
programs are transmitted to the development goals.  These impact transmissions are 
carried out by the ‘impact variables’.  In the present context, three development 
programs (i.e., crop diversification program; system rehabilitation, and bulk water 
allocation policy) and one development goal (i.e., food security) are considered. 
(4)  Before asking questions, the conceptual framework is briefly explained to give 
adequate background for the respondents. First, the 3 development programs and 
their role in food security, then, their impact pathways defined by the impact variables, 
and, finally, the role of institutional factors in affecting these pathways are all 
explained to them. 
(5)  The respondents are also informed that the questions to be asked are related to 
different components of the framework and answers are expected with respect to the 
conditions prevalent in KOB in particular and Sri Lanka in general. 
(6)  More importantly, it is necessary to convince them that the evaluation is done in an 
ex-ante context and what they perceive or believe about various relationships in the 
conceptual framework are very important and valuable for the evaluation and analysis.  
Also, it is important to inform them that the development programs can both those 
that are implemented as well as those that are contemplated or potentially relevant for 
the KOB or Sri Lanka. 
(7)  All questions are formulated as yes or no questions or questions requiring answers 
within the scale of 1-10, with ‘1’ being low or weak and ‘10’ being high or strong, 
depending on the context.  For coding purpose, a ‘no’ answer is treated as 0 and the 
‘yes’ answer is evaluated within the scale of 1-10.  Thus, all answers are recorded 






PART-B: BASIC DETAILS 
 
(1) Respondent’s Details: 
 
(a) Name  ……………………………………. 
 
(b) Qualification  ……………………………………. 
 
(c) Discipline  ……………………………………. 
 
(d) Professional Position  ……………………………………. 
 
  (e) Years of Experience  ……………………………………. 
 
  (f) Contact Details  ……………………………………. 
   
   ……………………………………. 
 
   ……………………………………. 
 
   ……………………………………. 
 
   Email……………………………… 
 
(2) Interview Details: 
 
(a) Interviewers Name   …………………………………… 
 






1.  Food Security (FOODSECT) 
(a)  How strong, in your opinion, is the food security status of small farmers?.........................................124   
(b)  How strong, in your opinion, is the food security status of farm workers? ........................................124   
(c)  How strong, in your opinion, is the food security status of the rural poor? ........................................124   
(d)  How strong, in your opinion, is the nutritional status of children and aged? ......................................124   
 
2. Crop  Diversification  (CROPDIVR) 
  (From low to high-value crops; e.g., paddy to vegetables, oilseeds, and fruits) 
(a)  How bright are the economic and technical prospects for crop diversification? ..................................124   
(b)  How effective are the crop diversification efforts of the government?  ..............................................124  
(c)  How important are customs in crop choice? ..................................................................................124 
(d)  How serious are customs in constraining crop diversification? .........................................................124 
(e)  How important is water delivery system for crop diversification? .....................................................124 
(f)  How serious is small farm size as a constraint for crop diversification? ............................................124 






3. System  Rehabilitation  (SYSREHAB) 
(a)  How effective is the system rehabilitation program? ......................................................................124 
(b)  How far can rehabilitation improve land and soil health (by limiting salinity)? ...................................124 
(c)  How important is system rehabilitation as a contributing factor for land productivity? ........................124 
(d)  How far system rehabilitation is effective in facilitating bulk water allocation? ..................................124 
 
4.  Bulk Water Distribution (BULKWATD) 
(a)  How far can bulk water distribution improve existing water allocation procedures? ............................124 
(b)  How far can bulk water distribution strengthen water user organizations? ........................................124 
(c)  How far can bulk water distribution contribute to crop diversification? .............................................124 
(d)  How far can bulk water distribution improve water use efficiency?  ..................................................124 
(e)  How far can bulk water distribution contribute to land & soil health?  ...............................................124 
 
5.  Crop Pattern (CROPATEN) 
(a)  To what extent can crop diversification alter crop pattern? .............................................................124 
(b)  How far can diversification lead to the adoption of high-value crops? ...............................................124 
(c)  How far can the changes in crop pattern lead to water savings?  .....................................................124 
(d)  Haw far can the changes in crop pattern improve land and soil health (via crop rotation)? .................124 
(e)  How far can the changes in crop pattern negatively affect foodgrain output? ....................................124 
(f)  How far can the changes crop pattern negatively affect fodder/feed supply? ....................................124 
(g)  How far can the changes in crop pattern raise cultivation costs? .....................................................124 
(h)  If crop pattern shifts towards high-value crops, how important is this shift for the development  
  of rural non-farm activities? .......................................................................................................124 
 
6. Land  Productivity  (LANPRODY) 
  (Output per unit of land; it differs by crops) 
(a)  How important is land productivity for farm employment? ..............................................................124 
(b)  How important is land productivity for farm income? .....................................................................124 
(c)  How important is land productivity for labor productivity? ..............................................................124 
(d)  Generally, higher land productivity leads to higher water productivity.  How strong will be  
  this relationship between land and water productivity? ..................................................................124 
(e)  Crop pattern changes, though reduce the area under food crops, can also improve the  
  overall farm productivity.  If so, how significant will be this effect?  .................................................124 
(f)  System rehabilitation and bulk water delivery can improve water delivery and contribute,  











7.   Water Productivity (WATPRODY) 
  (Output per unit of applied water; it differs by crops) 
 
  Generally, efficient water use contributes to land productivity, partly by minimizing the negative effects of 
water over use (e.g., waterlogging; Salinity) and partly by enhancing the efficiency and productivity of other 
farm inputs.  If this is so,  
 
(a)  How strong will be the impact of water use efficiency on land productivity? ......................................124 
(b)  How strong will be the impact of water use efficiency on the efficiency of other inputs? .....................124 
 
8.  Labor Productivity (LABPRODY) 
  (Output per labor; it differs by crops) 
 
(a)  Generally, higher labor productivity will lead to higher wage rate.  If so, how strong (or weak)  
    is the relationship between labor productivity and wage rates? .......................................................124 
(b)  Generally, efficient and productive workers do the same or more work.  If so, how important  
  is the role of productivity in determining the overall level of farm employment? ...............................124 
 
9.  Rural Employment (RURALEMP) 
 
(a)  Generally, given the level of land productivity, more employment means less labor productivity. 
    If so, how strong is this negative relationship?  .............................................................................124 
(b)  Generally, for given wage rates, more employment means more income.  But, with low or declining  
    wage rates, more employment may not always lead to more income.  How realistic is this fact? .........124 
  
10. Wage Rates (WAGERATE) 
 
(a)  How strong is the influence of higher wage rates on cultivation costs? .............................................124 
(b)  Are the wage rates high enough to provide incentive for improved labor productivity?  
    If so, how strong will be this effect? ............................................................................................124 
(c)  Are the wage rates adequate enough to assure decent income for farm workers?   
  If so, how strong will be this fact? ...............................................................................................124 
 
11. Cultivation Costs (CULTCOST) 
 
(a)  Given that higher cultivation costs reduce agricultural income, will the additional costs due to crop  
    diversification reduce small farmers’ income?. If so, how serious is this cost effect on farm income? ...124 
(b)  At the same time, the additional costs due to diversification can also be smaller in relation to the 
additional income from the same.  If so, how important is this fact for crop choice? ..........................124 
 
12. Agricultural Income (AGLINCOM)  
 
(a)  While farm income is a necessary condition for food security, other non-income factors (e.g., food  
  price and supply, its quality and composition, and family size) are also important.  Given this, how  
  important is the relative role of income in ensuring food security? ..................................................124 
 
13. Land Quality and Soil Health (LANHELTH) 
 
(a)  How important is land and soil health for land productivity, especially in the long-run? ......................124 






14. Food Production (FOODPROD) 
 
(a)  Normally, higher food production means more food supply in the market.  But, export, procurement,  
    and hoarding can reduce food availability.  If so, how serious is this effect? .....................................124 
(b)  Similarly, higher food output means low food prices for consumers.  But, the factors noted above  
  may act against such price decline.  If so, how serious is this effect?  ..............................................124 
 
 
15. Non-farm Enterprises (NFAMENTS) 
  (e.g., small enterprises, petty trade, handicrafts, services) 
 
(a)  Does labor scarcity affect farm wage rates?  If so, how significant is this effect? ...............................124 
(b)  How important are non-farm activities for rural employment?  ........................................................124 
(c)  Do non-farm activities create farm labor scarcity?  If so how serious is this effect?  ...........................124 
 
16. Fodder and Feed Supply (FEDSUPLY) 
  (e.g., rice straw, husks, and other farm by-products) 
 
(a)  How important is the role of agriculture in supplying fodder and feeds? ...........................................124 
(b)  Does change in crop pattern (say from paddy to vegetables or oilseeds) will affect fodder supply?   
    If so, how serious will be this negative effect? ..............................................................................124 
(c)  If the farm families with livestock rely on green fodder from public grazing lands and home gardens,  
  crop pattern changes does not matter much.  How realistic is this fact? ...........................................124 
 
17. Livestock and Poultry (LIVSTOCK) 
  (This does not relate to commercial enterprises, but only maintained by rural families) 
 
(a)  How important are livestock & poultry for self-employment? ..........................................................124 
(b)  How important are livestock & poultry as an income source for small farmers? .................................124 
(c)  How important are livestock & poultry as an income source for farm workers and the poor?  ..............124 
(d)  How important are livestock & poultry for the family consumption of milk & meat?  ...........................124 
(e)  How important are livestock & poultry for the nutritional security of the children and aged? ...............124 
 
18. Farm Income (FAMINCOM) 
 
(a)  How food-secure are the small farmers? ......................................................................................124 
(b)  Is this security due to their cultivating food (paddy) crops? If so, how realistic is this fact? ................124 
(c)  Is food security role crops at the cost of crop diversification?  If so, how realistic is this fact? .............124 
 
19. Labor Income (LABINCOM) 
 
(a)  How adequate are the wage income of rural workers to assure their food security? ...........................124 
(b)  How critical are the livestock and non-farm income sources for rural workers and the poor?  ..............124 
 
20. Food Availability (FOODAVAL) 
 






21. Food Price (FOODPRIC) 
 
(b)  How affordable are food prices to rural workers and the poor? ........................................................124 
 
22. Land Tenure (LANTENUR) 
  (Farm size; Tenure Security) 
 
(a)  How important is farm size for adopting improved farm technologies and practices? .........................124 
(b)  How important is tenure security for adopting improved farm technologies and practices? .................124 
(c)  How important is land titles in securing farm credits? ....................................................................124 
(d)  How serious are small farms as constraints for efficient water delivery?............................................124 
(e)  Are smaller farms more efficient in water use? If so, how realistic is this fact? ..................................124 
(f)  Generally, small farms are unable to benefit from scale economies.   
  If so, how serious is this fact in affecting their cultivation costs? .....................................................124 
 
23. Water Institutions (WATINSTN) 
  (Water release policy; allocation procedures) 
 
(a)  How flexible is the water release policy for promoting diverse crops? ..............................................124 
(b)  How suitable are the existing water allocation practices for efficient water use? ................................124 
 
24. Farm Input Institutions (FAMINSTN) 
  (Credit, farm inputs, and extension institutions) 
 
(a)  How effective and accessible is the farm credit system for small farmers? ........................................124 
(b)  How effective and accessible are the fertilizer and seeds supply systems for small farmers? ...............124 
(c)  How effective and accessible is the farm extension system for small farmers? ..................................124 
(d)  Are the farm input supply systems, including credit, too costly for small farmers?   
    If so, how serious is this issue?  ..................................................................................................124 
(e)  Are the farm input supply, including credit, focused on particular crops (e.g., paddy or coconut)? 
  If so, how serious is this as a constraint for crop diversification? .....................................................124 
 
25. Customary Institutions (CUSINSTN) 
  (Local customs, conventions, traditions, and informal rules) 
 
(a)  Normally, farmers’ choice of food or traditional crops (e.g., paddy) is thought to be influenced by  
    customary practices. If so, how limiting are local customs for crop diversification? ............................124 
(b)  How influential are local customs and conventions in water allocation and use decisions?  ..................124 
(c)  Are there strong traditions in maintaining local commons as grazing areas for livestock? ...................124 
 
26. Rural Development Policy (RDVPOLCY) 
 
(a)  How effective are state policies in promoting rural non-farm activities?  ...........................................124 
(b)  Are there special programs for developing specific non-farm enterprises (e.g., handicrafts; food  








27. Market Institutions (MKTINSTN) 
 
(a)  How effective are the agricultural markets in providing the right prices for farmers? .........................124 
(b)  How important is the role of traders and middlemen in the marketing of farm outputs? .....................124 
(c)  How effective are markets in stabilizing harvest and post-harvest price fluctuations? ........................124 
(d)  How effective is the procurement policy in supporting farm prices? .................................................124 
 
28. Wage/Labor Legislations (WAGELAWS) 
  (Legislations on wage rates and working conditions) 
 
(a)  How effective are the minimum wage legislations in guiding rural wage rates?  .................................124 
(b)  How strong are local customs and social pressures in influencing rural wage rates? ..........................124 
(c)  How effective are the special legal provisions (e.g., child labor; minimum working hour) in affecting  
 rural  labor  supply and employment?  ...........................................................................................124 
 
29. Trade Policy (TRDPOLCY) 
   (Farm import and export policies) 
 
(a)  Do the trade policies on the import of milk and meat products limit livestock & poultry development?  
    If so, how serious is this constraint? ............................................................................................124 
(b)  Do the trade policies on the import of food products add to domestic food availability?   
  If so, how important is this policy for food and nutritional security?  ................................................124 
  
30. Price Regulations (PRICREGL) 
 
(a)  How effective are price regulations in controlling the food prices for consumers? ..............................124 
(b)  Do price regulations distort agricultural markers?  If so, how serious is this effect? ...........................124 
 
31. Farm Subsidy Policy (SUBPOLCY) 
  (Fertilizer and credit subsidies) 
 
(a)  How effective are the subsidies for fertilizers and farm credits in reducing cultivations costs? .............124 
(b)  Do these subsidies have a favorable effect on farm income?  If so, how significant are their effect?  ....124 
 
32. Samurdhi Policy (SAMPOLCY) 
  (Special State program for Poverty alleviation)  
 
(a)  How effective is the Samurdhi policy in supporting the income of the rural poor?  ............................124 
(b)  How effective is the Samurdhi policy in improving the food availability to rural poor? .......................124 
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ANNEX C: DERIVING THE REDUCED 
FORM EQUATION  
 
 
No Exogenous  Variables  Notation  used 
1 SYSREHAB  X1 
2 LANTENUR  X2 
3 CUSINSTN  X3 
4 FAMINSTN  X4 
5 MKTINSTN  X5 
6 PRICREGL  X6 
7 WAGELAWS  X7 
8 RDVPOLCY  X8 
9 TRDPOLCY  X9 
10 SUBPOLCY  X10 




1 BULKWATD  Y1 
2 CROPDIVR  Y2 
3 CROPATEN  Y3 
4 WATINSTN  Y4 
5 WATPRODY  Y5 
6 LANHELTH  Y6 
7 LANPRODY  Y7 
8 FEDSUPLY  Y8 
9 LIVSTOCK  Y9 
10 NFAMENTS  Y10 
11 LABPRODY  Y11 
12 WAGERATE  Y12 
13 RURALEMP  Y13 
14 CULTCOST  Y14 
15 AGLINCOM  Y15 
16 FAMINCOM  Y16 
17 LABINCOM  Y17 
18 FOODPROD  Y18 
19 FOODAVAL  Y19 
20 FOODPRIC  Y20 
21 FOODSECT  Y21 
 
With the notations for all the exogenous 
and endogenous variables as assigned in 
the above table, the 21 equations of the 






) , ( 2 1 1 1 X X F Y   =
) , ( 4 1 2 2 X Y F Y   =
) , , ( 3 2 2 3 3 X X Y F Y   =
) , , ( 3 2 1 4 4 X X Y F Y   =
) , , ( 4 4 3 5 5 X Y Y F Y   =
) , , ( 2 5 3 6 6 X Y Y F Y   =
) , , ( 4 6 3 7 7 X Y Y F Y   =
) , ( 3 3 8 8 X Y F Y   =
) , ( 9 8 9 9 X Y F Y   =
) , ( 8 3 10 10 X Y F Y   =
) , ( 7 3 11 11 Y Y F Y   =
) , , ( 7 11 10 12 12 X Y Y F Y   =
) , , , ( 12 10 9 7 13 13 Y Y Y Y F Y   =
) , , , ( 10 4 12 3 14 14 X X Y Y F Y   =
) , , ( 5 14 7 15 15 X Y Y F Y   =
) , , ( 15 10 9 16 16 Y Y Y F Y   =
) , , , ( 11 13 10 9 17 17 X Y Y Y F Y   =
) , , ( 7 5 3 18 18 Y Y Y F Y   =
) , , ( 9 5 18 19 19 X X Y F Y   =
) , , ( 6 5 18 20 20 X X Y F Y   =




Given these equations and their 
sequential linkages depicted in Figure 6, 
the reduced form equation can be 
specified as a single but very long 
equation shown below. 
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As can be seen, this single but long equation, which is representing the reduced form 
for the system model, has four main components, i.e., F20 (.), F19 (.), F17(.), and F16(.). 
Each of these components is based on the following general structure built using 12 
different symbols for brackets: 
{ [ () ] } ∫ ∫ ∫∫ > < ..... ..... ..... .... ... ... ..... ....}.... ...)....]. ..... [.....(... .....{.... ..... ...... ..... ..... . .... ..... .....
 
 